The political role of the Macedonian Constitutional Court has been ignored and omitted from study by academia, as well as from commentaries and interpretations by legal professionals. The latter understand the Constitutional Court as part of the judicial system of the country and recognize its role as a legal institution which decides on matters disputed by two parties. The notion of the Constitutional Court as arbitrator and mediator remains, and the opposite notion that the Court is a truly political institution that selects among competing rules and values is typically denied or ignored at best. This paper explores the position, jurisdiction, institutional structure, operation and jurisprudence of the Macedonian Constitutional Court as policymaker. To that extent, the paper analyses the Constitutional Court as an actor that is influenced by, but also as an actor whose decisions influence, politics and political discourse. It also assesses the “hit-and-miss” opportunities the Constitutional Court had in its contribution in the transformation of the Macedonian society into a society that adheres to and promotes democratic values and principles.
