

# Passage4prevent

REFERRAL  
MECHANISM FOR  
PREVENT FROM  
RADICALIZATION

DR. MARIJA RISTESKA



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This policy model was developed within the Project: **“Educate to Prevent - Strengthening Front-line School Workers and Parents to Build Youth Resilience to Violent Extremism”** implemented by Centre for Research and Policy Making – CRPM and Centre for Education Development – CED in association with NEXUS civil concept. The publication is prepared with the support of OSCE Mission to Skopje and the Hedayah Centre of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism as part of the *STRIVE Global Program, through the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) of the European Union*.

The opinions and viewpoints expressed in this publication do not represent the opinions of the OSCE or the European Union or any other supporting organization.

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# Introduction

This referral mechanism is developed within the framework of the project “Educate to Prevent –Strengthening Front-line School Workers and Parents to Build Youth Resilience to Violent Extremism,” implemented by CRPM in partnership with CED and NEXUS, funded by the European Union within the STRIVE Global Program managed by the Hedayah Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism. The E2P project aims to develop community resilience to radicalization and violent extremism through the empowerment of front-line school workers and students’ parents. The mechanism is based on the mapping and capacity assessment of local level institutions conducted by IOM in the end of 2018 as well as the report from the roundtables with municipal stakeholders on the implementation of the National CVE Strategy that was led by the OSCE Mission to Skopje. The referral mechanism for prevention of radicalization is coordinated with ongoing initiatives of Search for Common Ground and CIVIL Center for Freedom which are funded by the British and American Embassies respectfully.

The referral mechanism Passage4Prevent is embedded in the legal and institutional framework of the country. It is also based on the experiences of other countries that have developed and implemented referral mechanisms as part of their pre-criminal intervention models to prevent radicalization that can lead to violent extremism. The mechanism is voluntary by nature and relies on non-discriminatory risk assessments to be applied by trained professionals: non-security actors, including psychosocial care providers, teachers, health practitioners, religious and other community leaders in taking proactive, preventative measures to safeguard the relevant individual, community, and society by providing support services and treatment that mitigate risks of radicalization, address needs for redirecting attention to services that can support the referred individuals through specifically tailored support plans. The referral mechanism features multiagency cooperation for which the existing coordination channels and information-sharing protocols for other phenomena, such as child delinquency, domestic violence and etc. need to be enhanced.

# 1. Prevention of violent extremism

On the state and local level, interethnic relations in the Republic of North Macedonia between the communities continue to remain tense especially in parts of the country, where extremist groups disposed to use the violence for achieving their political goals are still present and active. Therefore, the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia has adopted in early 2018 a Strategy for countering forms of radicalization that can lead to violent extremism. The Strategy offers new comprehensive and holistic, preventive-based approaches based on the following Guiding Principles for countering violent extremism – CVE: principle of constitutionality and legality; principles of rule of law, respect for human rights and freedoms, non-discrimination and focus on personal data protection; principle of ensuring a safe, secure and sovereign Republic of North Macedonia; principle of a comprehensive national approach.

The aim of the National Strategy is to provide for and promote a safe, secure a prosperous state, through coordinated activities, that prevent, protect, pursue and respond to early identification and detection of the factors that contribute to radicalism, extremism and violent action in the form of terrorism and/or terrorist activities. The Strategy on the national level aims to improve the standardization of its institutional response to CVE through creating comprehensive training and support for interagency information, data, and intelligence sharing platforms, and improve mutual trust and collaboration among government security services and community leaders. The Strategy on the municipal level aims to develop the processes and procedures to encourage community programs that support societal cohesion to prevent violent extremism.

The Strategy endorses the Whole of Government approach (WGA) and the Whole of Society approach (WSA) which in essence means engaging all institutions and the society at large in preventing signs of radicalization. To this end, the establishment of Functional Teams, Working Groups, Task Forces and Inter-institutional cooperation is essential to safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children, youth and adults from radicalization that can lead to violent extremism.

The National Strategy in the Strategic goal 1.3 Strong and resilient community, envisions an activity that is the basis for this document. Activ-

ity 1.3.8 regulates Setting up a National Preventive Mechanism for referral of persons in the period 2018-2019. The mechanism is planned to involve the National Committee on Countering Violent Extremism and Counter-Terrorism (NCCVET), the Ministry of Local Self-Government, the Local Self-Government Units, the State Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Groups, and the Ministry of Health in the development and piloting phase of the national preventive mechanism. There is no other act that provides the legal basis for a national preventive mechanism for referral of persons to be established.

The establishment of a preventive mechanism for referral of individuals is part of a range of possible interventions that supplement efforts to prevent radicalization that can lead to violent extremism. The primary aim of prevention is to build community resilience and social cohesion to resist the appeal of radicalization. It focuses on non-radicalized communities by increasing awareness on human rights and governance; corruption; addressing the risks of violent extremism through education; public information campaigns and community debates and training for skills such as dialogues; critical thinking; media literacy; inter-ethnic and inter-faith conflict resolution. The secondary step in prevention takes the whole-of-the-community approach by engaging different community stakeholders to devise intervention support plans for potentially radicalized communities through referral to services that offer psychosocial support, mentoring, religious guidance on theological and doctrinal differences and inquiries, provide education and skills that will improve employability, offer training and services that will support individuals to resist push and pull factors towards radicalization.

## **2. Safeguarding from radicalization – a public health approach**

The National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism is guided by the following core principles of CVE: secure and safe citizens of the Republic of North Macedonia; building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions that will support and develop public trust therein; ensuring an environment that is conducive to enhanced economic development; ensuring national unity and communities resilient to radicalization and violent extremism.

The Strategy places the preventive mechanism for referral of individuals at the local level as the local self-government units are the closest government bodies to citizens and can provide the appropriate support and services for preventing radicalization that can lead to violent extremism. The basis for the municipality to set the referral mechanism for prevention of radicalization lies in Art.21 of the Law on Local Self-Government which regulates the municipal competences, “the municipalities independently and based on law can regulate their scope of work in public interest and of importance to the local community”. In this respect the municipalities have a number of competences that are regulated in Art.22 and also can be considered as legal basis for the preventive mechanism. For example, the municipality is responsible for social protection and child welfare and in particular should safeguard individuals that are exposed to social risk and carry out public awareness raising. Furthermore, the paragraph 9 of the same article regulates the competences in health protection where preventive activities and providing support to people with specific needs can be also considered as legal basis for the establishment of the preventive model. Taken together, these competences support the application of a public health lens to the development of a referral mechanism.


The public health approach recognizes the importance of understanding radicalization that can lead to violent extremism as a social phenomenon. Considering that this phenomenon can have far reaching impact on a society, well beyond the physical harm caused by a single attack and thus the need to involve a range of non-security actors, including psychosocial care providers, teachers, and religious and other community leaders in taking proactive, preventative measures to safeguard the relevant individual, community, and society<sup>1</sup>.

The preventive programs that the legal framework in the country allows to be established by the municipalities should target “at-risk” groups and seek to intervene in an individual’s pathway to terrorist radicalization before the line of criminal activity is crossed. These are called “off-ramps” or “exit programs”. They are typically voluntary and include psychosocial support, mentoring, theological/doctrinal debate, education and/or employment training and support.

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1 OSCE 2019, “**Understanding Referral Mechanisms in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: Navigating challenges and protecting human rights – A focus on South-Eastern Europe**”

Figure1<sup>2</sup>



### 3. Map and capacity of institutions

The map of institutions and the assessment of their capacities for the prevention of violent extremism has been developed by the professors Suzana Bornarova and Natasha Bogoevska on behalf of the International Organization for Migration.<sup>3</sup> The findings are presented in a Report on mapping of the institutional capacities for prevention of violent extremism. In addition, two other resources have been used: the baseline study carried out by CRPM on “Perceptions of front-line school workers and community officials from Skopje, Kumanovo, Tetovo and Gostivar on radicalization leading to violent extremism” and the reports from the OSCE-organized municipal roundtable discussions on the implementation of the National CVE strategy at the local level. All sources have been produced in the course of 2018 using participatory research methods. Based on these inputs, the institutions to be included in the preventive model for referral of individuals are outlined in the subsequent sections.

2 Challgren, Jonathan et al. Countering Violent Extremism: Applying The Public Health Model, 1st ed. Georgetown University, Center for Security Studies, National Security Critical Issues Task Force, 2016 , cited in OSCE 2019 “**Understanding Referral Mechanisms** in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: Navigating challenges and protecting human rights – A focus on South-Eastern Europe”

<http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NSCITF-Report-on-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf>

3 Bornarova Suzana and Bogoevska Natasha (2018), *Report on mapping of the institutional capacities for prevention of violent extremism*, IOM

### 3.1. National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism and Counter-Terrorism (CVE and CT)

The National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Counter-Terrorism (CT) has been established with a decision in 2017 as a national coordinative body to monitor and analyze the situation pertaining to CVE and CT, and coordinate activities of the relevant institutions working on addressing the phenomenon of violent extremism and acts of terrorism. The NCCVET is managed and represented by the National Coordinator for CVE and CT. The composition of the NCCVET is made of all relevant institutions<sup>4</sup>, which contribute from different aspects to the prevention and countering of violent extremism and to counter terrorism, thus creating the basis for multi-sectoral cooperation at a strategic level. The Committee drafts national strategies for CVE and CT, with appropriate action plans; coordinates and directs the activities of all entities involved in the implementation of plans arising from national strategies in this area; builds relations with representatives of civil society, local self-government, religious communities, experts and the academic community in order to define and implement appropriate measures for CVE and CT; monitors regional and global trends and communicates with relevant institutions and partners on a regional and international level; coordinates the process of conducting evaluations, analyses and research on the causes and emerging forms, but also new trends in recruiting terrorists; and coordinates the activities related to implementation of national campaigns for preventing of violent extremism and radicalization that can lead to terrorism, the organizing of widely inclusive public debates, forums, seminars and the like.<sup>5</sup>

The mapping reports assesses that “the current status of the National Coordinator and the deputy coordinators does not provide opportunity

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<sup>4</sup> Ministry of the Interior; Ministry of Defense; Ministry of Justice; Directorate for Execution of Sanctions; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Local Self-Government; Ministry of Labor and Social Policy; Ministry of Education and Science; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Information Society and Administration; Ministry of Transport and Communications; Directorate for Financial Intelligence; Directorate for Financial Police; Customs Administration; The Intelligence Agency; The Basic Public Prosecutor's Office for Prosecuting Organized Crime and Corruption; Center for Crisis Management; Directorate for Protection and Rescue; Agency for Electronic Communications; Agency for Youth and Sports and the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Religious Groups

<sup>5</sup> Decision on Establishment of NCCVET (Official Gazette of the Republic of North Macedonia No. 98/2017)

for organized institutional action”. Not all members of the Committee have capacities for monitoring, analyzing and coordinating the activities aimed at preventing violent extremism. The IOM mapping report therefore recommends specialized trainings in particular for the representatives from the institutions that are not traditionally considered as part of the security domain; as well as trainings focused on the social prevention component, which, although it is the competence of many of the institutions involved in the work of the National Committee, is not sufficiently recognized and promoted.<sup>6</sup>

### **3.2. Municipality**

Municipalities are the units of sub-national self-government. The list of competencies for which municipalities are charged to perform work in the public interest are regulated by Article 22 of the Law on local self-government: urban planning (urban and rural), protection of environment and nature, local economic development, communal activities, culture, sports and recreation, social protection and child protection, education - establishment, financing and management of schools up to the secondary level in cooperation with the central government, primary health protection, measures for protection and rescue of citizens, protection against fire, supervision over carrying out performance of its competences and other tasks stipulated by law.<sup>7</sup> The municipalities are governed by a mayor and a municipal council. Among the competences of the Council are the adoption of the municipal statute, issuance of decisions and other acts, determination of spatial, basic and detailed urban planning, adoption of budget and final accounts for implementation of the budget, overseeing the work of the public companies, service providers and other bodies established and/or managed by the municipality.

It should be noted that the policy work on countering violent extremism is only just emerging in the country which explains the low level of knowledge and awareness of the National Strategy for CVE and the current absence of a system of response to violent extremism. Since the adoption of the National Strategy for CVE by the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia in February 2018, the municipalities also are responsible for contributing to the system of institutional response to this phenomenon. Municipal authorities are required to prepare local

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action plans and together with local action teams to contribute to the implementation of the National strategy for CVE.

In any community-based approach for prevention of radicalization that can lead to violent extremism, the municipality is a central institution where the prevention model is anchored. However, two research reports show that the “municipalities need awareness raising, so that everyone in their municipalities equally understand the risks and dangers associated with allowing extremism to take hold within their societies, thus fostering another line of resilience against this phenomenon”.<sup>8</sup>

The CRPM research shows that municipalities are remotely aware of their role in countering violent extremism. Moreover, neither the Strategy nor the municipalities as noted by the research have indicated the need to collect data related to violent extremism. Furthermore, the municipalities’ capacities need to be improved in order for them to have an active role in the response system to prevent violent extremism, but also to follow and report upon the number, character, and level of violent incidents and of extremist rhetoric used by multiple stakeholders in the community. Setting up a system for data gathering and data management on a local level as well as regular reporting and analysis of the trends on national level is a critical need.<sup>9</sup>

### 3.3. Police

Public and national security is provided by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the police forces.<sup>10</sup> The Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Interior 2018-2020<sup>11</sup>, includes reform activities which will allow for participation in the fight against modern security threats and challenges, including terrorism and violent extremism.

The police work is carried out by the Bureau for Public Security through

8 Filip Stojkovski & Natasia Kalajdziovski (2018), Community Perspectives on the Prevention of Violent Extremism in Macedonia, Democracy Lab and Bergof Foundation

9 Filip Stojkovski, Ivan Stefanoski, Kristijan Aleksovski (2019), *Baseline study: Perceptions of front-line school workers and community officials from Skopje, Kumanovo, Tetovo and Gostivar on radicalization leading to violent extremism*, CRPM

10 Law on internal affairs (Official Gazette No. 42/2014, 116/2014, 33/2015), available online: <http://www.mvr.gov.mk/Upload/Documents/ZVR%20nov%20precisten%2005.03.15.pdf>

11 Strategic plan of the Ministry of Interior 2018-2020, available online: [https://mvr.gov.mk/Upload/Editor\\_Upload/%D0%A1%D0%9F-2018-2020-%D0%B7%D0%B0-%D1%81%D0%B0%D1%98%D1%82\(1\).pdf](https://mvr.gov.mk/Upload/Editor_Upload/%D0%A1%D0%9F-2018-2020-%D0%B7%D0%B0-%D1%81%D0%B0%D1%98%D1%82(1).pdf)

sectors for internal affairs that are established on the territory depending on the size of the geographic area, the population number, the number of criminal acts and misdemeanors. In this respect, the sector for internal affairs according to law it has the following responsibilities for prevention of violent extremism: monitors and analyzes the security situation and phenomena that endanger public safety; and works on the prevention of criminality. The internal organization and systematization of jobs in the sector for internal affairs, as well as in the police stations and units, provides the basis for carrying out preventive activities related to violent extremism by the police officers at the local level.<sup>12</sup> In each police station where sector for internal affairs is established there are three inspectors for prevention: for public order and peace, for traffic and for criminal matters<sup>13</sup>. However, capacity for prevention was specifically built through implementation of the project “Community Policing in the Function of Prevention of Radicalization and Violent Extremism” with the support of the OSCE Mission to Skopje.<sup>14</sup> To this end and according to the Rulebook on Implementation of Police Work, community policing, the constable, patrolling and the moto-patrolling police activity are most relevant. These activities have not received specified roles in the prevention of the violent extremism in the local community, except in Kumanovo where in the course of 2018 the Ministry of Interior started the implementation of the project on introduction of neighborhood constable or police officer in Kumanovo<sup>15</sup>.

### 3.4. Center for Social Work

The Center for Social Work (CSW) functions as a public institution for social protection, with public authorization to perform social protection activities according to the Law on Social Protection. According to the Law on Social Protection, the CSWs should implement measures and activities for social prevention i.e. to prevent the occurrence of social risks, early detection and early treatment of the individual exposed

12 Bornarova Suzana and Bogoevska Natasha (2018), *Report on mapping of the institutional capacities for prevention of violent extremism*, IOM

13 Ibid

14 According to IOM *Report on mapping of the institutional capacities for prevention of violent extremism*, significant number of the police officers and employees in the Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence (1,400 police officers and 500 people in criminalistics) were trained.

15 Bornarova Suzana and Bogoevska Natasha (2018), *Report on mapping of the institutional capacities for prevention of violent extremism*, IOM

to social risk, in order to overcome or mitigate the harmful consequences from the exposure to social risk. In the area of social prevention, measures are undertaken to prevent the occurrence of social risk for the individuals, family or group of individuals, through educational and counseling work, development of self-help forms, volunteering with personal engagement and use of other methods that correspond to the needs of the social protection beneficiaries.<sup>16</sup>

The provision of social services, including the preventive activities by the Centers for Social Work, relies on multi-agency cooperation with the municipality, the pre-school institutions, schools, the health institutions and other state bodies and authorities, legal entities, individuals and associations. The CSW plan the preventive activities in the annual work programs; however, the IOM mapping report assesses that although the annual programs of the CSW anticipate preventive activities, no financial resources are allocated for such activities<sup>17</sup> and thus no PVE activities are implemented so far.

### 3.5. Schools

Countering violent extremism by engaging frontline school workers (teachers, principals, and administrative officials) is a particularly important aspect of countering violent extremism among youth, in that education or lack thereof can be a critical component of whether someone will develop extremist views in their lifetime. In this respect there are measures currently used such as the following: pedagogical measures in elementary schools<sup>18</sup> and pedagogical measures applied for the violation of duties and failure to meet the obligations as student.<sup>19</sup> On both levels of education there is an option for the parents/ guardians to be sent for counseling, whereas the psychologist or pedagogue provides counseling for the student, after completing the counseling for the par-

16 Law on Social Protection (Official Gazette of the Republic of North Macedonia No. 79/09, 36/11, 51/11, 166/12, 15/13, 79/13, 164/13, 187/13, 38/14, 44/14, 116/14, 180/14, 33/15, 72/15, 104/15, 150/15, 173/15, 192/15 and 30/16, 163/2017)

17 Bornarova Suzana and Bogoevska Natasha (2018), *Report on mapping of the institutional capacities for prevention of violent extremism*, IOM

18 Reprimand, verbal warning, written warning, reduction of behavior assessment, moving the student to another class and moving of the student to another elementary school, if there is consent from that school to accept the student

19 Written warning, warning before removal and removal from the public school. The pedagogical measure of removal can be imposed only for more severe violation of the duty determined by the statute of the school.

ents/ guardians.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, a *counseling referral* measure is used if: during the school year the student has a negative grade in three or more subjects, the student has done more than ten unjustified or 100 justified absences, the student is undisciplined, the student offends the teacher, the student participates in fights or other forms of violence, the student shows an asocial or antisocial behavior, the student behaves immorally or unethically and the student's attainments have dropped significantly in a short period of time. The counseling is done in accordance with the Program for Counseling of Parents, which is prepared by the Pedagogical Service.<sup>21</sup>

However, all measures used and newly developed must be informed of the concept of preventing violent extremism and tailor made to decrease vulnerability to radicalization. To this end, the CRPM Baseline Study regarding basic perceptions shows that: (1) the frontline school workers do not have clarity about the difference between the main terms in the CVE orbit or about what violent extremism actually is; (2) they also lacked familiarity with most of the national strategies on the topic. The study identified needs of teachers to include topics on the risks of violent extremism in the school curriculum, training<sup>22</sup>, and resources and tools for prevention activities in schools. Overall a systematic and standardized approach to CVE in schools is recommended. A reform of counseling services is also needed as it is too formalized, inflexible and is not tailored to the needs and specifics of the living situation of each student and his/ her family.<sup>23</sup>

### 3.6. Health centers

In a multiagency system for the prevention of violent extremism, the health care sphere is an important link as it includes a system of social and individual measures, activities and procedures for: preserving and promoting health, prevention, early detection and suppression of dis-

<sup>20</sup> In accordance with the Program for Counseling of Students, prepared by the Pedagogical Service.

<sup>21</sup> Bornarova Suzana and Bogoevska Natasha (2018), *Report on mapping of the institutional capacities for prevention of violent extremism*, IOM

<sup>22</sup> According to the study a large majority of teachers had not attended training on the topic of VE or ethnic/religious tolerance in the past five years (78%).

<sup>23</sup> The IOM mapping study determines that Basically, the legislation on counseling is too restrictive, the approach, format and content of the professional work are inadequate, which reduces the possibilities for positive effects of the counseling. Namely, counseling in a group of up to 20 parents in precisely determined time terms is a limiting approach that lacks individualization.

eases, timely and effective treatment, health care and rehabilitation and other measures regulated with the Law on Social Protection and Law on Mental Health.<sup>24</sup> While there is no direct causal link between mental illness and violent extremism, there is increasing evidence that in many cases youth who are radicalizing to violence experience poor psychological adjustment.<sup>25</sup> Therefore tackling the phenomena in most cases involves mental health professionals and institutions with their current capacities upgraded and tailor made to the cultural sensitivities surrounding mental health treatment or other psychosocial care in each country.

The psychiatric institutions and the centers for mental health provide treatment for persons with mental health problems of any kind, promotion of mental health and prevention of mental illnesses, and psychosocial care, including community rehabilitation. There are three mental health centers on the territory of the City of Skopje and one mental health center in Tetovo, Strumica, Gevgelija, Demir Hisar, and Prilep, as well as three specialized centers for mental health of children and youth (two in Skopje and one in Bitola). The protection of the mental health of the individuals with mental illness is based on the support by, and in, the community where they live as the municipal council establishes a Committee for Mental Health on issues of interest to persons with mental illness. According to the law, the Commission performs the following activities: it monitors the situation with the protection of the rights of the persons with mental illness, examines complaints from people with mental illness and proposes measures to the competent authorities, proposes measures for improving the conditions for accommodation and care for persons with mental illness to the competent authorities and performs other activities in accordance with the law.<sup>26</sup> However, the work of these commissions is not recognized and visible at the local level.<sup>27</sup>

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24 Law on Mental Health - clear text - (Official Gazette of the Republic of North Macedonia No.71/07, 150/15)

25 OSCE 2019, **“Understanding Referral Mechanisms in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: Navigating challenges and protecting human rights – A focus on South-Eastern Europe”**

26 Ibid

27 Bornarova Suzana and Bogoevska Natasha (2018), *Report on mapping of the institutional capacities for prevention of violent extremism*, IOM

### 3.7. Religious communities

The two largest religious communities, the Macedonian Orthodox church and the Islamic Religious community can play very important roles as part of the multiagency system for prevention of radicalization on the local level, as religiously-motivated radicalization is one of the assessed risks. Involving religious communities in the system provides the opportunity for further education, demystification of extremist religious narratives and the construction of persuasive alternative and counter narratives. The roundtable discussions organized by the OSCE and the National Committee for CVE and CT have shown that communities believe that religious authorities can and should play a constructive role in the prevention of radicalization that can lead to violent extremism on two levels: (i) through working with families; and (ii) through educating the youth and offering alternative interpretations to the teachings and narratives propagated by some extremist proponents of Islam or Christianity. Religious leaders should consider approaching families as some problems experienced in family relations can become a contributing factor to an individual's path to radicalization. Working with families is crucial in order to develop a culture of understanding and inter-ethnic cooperation and should play an active role in creating narratives that offer a mainstream interpretation of the religion that would prevent the spread of a radical ideology.

## 4. Referral mechanism

Considering the above mapping of institutions, it is assessed that there is capacity and existing structures which are relevant to the need of creating a preventive model for referrals of individuals that are at risk of radicalization that can lead to violent extremism. **This is a proposal for a referral mechanism that is anchored at the community level and foresees a multi-agency structure** allowing for risk assessment and support of the individual from different perspectives: psychological, educational, social, health, cultural, religious and etc. The principles of work of the proposed structure is based on joint decision making and coordinated action. For that purpose, the proposed model is based on cooperation between the involved multiple agencies that is clearly structured and regulated with a protocol and non-disclosure agreement that sets the rules for information sharing between the institutions about the individual and data pro-

tection, including non-disclosure to other agencies outside the referral mechanism.

Considering that there are existing structures already in place at the municipal level such as the coordination bodies for domestic violence, the coordination bodies for child delinquency, municipal coordination body for violence in schools, as well as the existing helpline for violence available on national level and operated by a CSO, in addition to the 'off ramp' services available at the municipal level, **the proposed model does not foresee establishment of a new body** but upgrading the scope of work of one of these bodies. Most appropriate is the coordination body for domestic violence as it is a multi-agency mechanism with worked-out coordination and signed protocols between the included institutions. The only difference between the domestic violence model and the preventive model for referral is the role of the police. Considering that family violence is criminalized, the police have a clear role in executing the Criminal Code in the acts of violence against the perpetrators. In the preventive model for referring individuals, the radical behavior that can lead to violent extremism is considered to be in the pre-criminal space and therefore the model for prevention needs to exclude the police from directly assessing individuals, but to allow an oversight of trends and numbers of cases supported by the mechanism in the respective municipality and address those trends with a prevention program through community policing, the constable, patrolling and the moto-patrolling police activities. On the other hand, the multi-agency model for domestic violence needs to be upgraded to include the role of schools and the religious communities. In this regard, the agencies included are the municipality, the social centers, the health centers, and the religious communities. These should offer primary prevention to build community resilience and social cohesion to resist the appeal of radicalization followed with secondary prevention by engaging different community stakeholders to devise support plans for potentially radicalized communities and offer psychosocial support. On the operational level, unlike the model for domestic violence where the agencies included do not meet regularly, the preventive model for referral of individuals vulnerable to radicalization that can lead to violent extremism will **have regular meeting points and discussions on cases on an individual basis** to agree on appropriate courses of action for individual cases. This is necessary as the support plan cannot be delivered by one institution only but the 'whole-of-society' approach is needed.

The model is designed to offer **necessary political backing on the national and local level**. Namely the National Committee for countering violent extremism is foreseen to provide strategic guidance, whereas on the local level the strategic referral board consisting of the President of the Municipal Council, the General Secretary of the municipality and the Head of public works departments provide the political backing. In this way the activities of the referral mechanism will be in sync with the National Strategy for CVE (ensured by the National Committee for CVE and CT) and with the objectives, annual program and budget of the municipality. The program for the prevention of violent extremism can be voted by the Council and may include measures and a budget for activities of the referral mechanism, its operation and support to services through which individual support plans are implemented.

The **inter-agency communication and cooperation needs to be regulated with a joint protocol**. This can be the same protocol between institutions signed for the purpose of domestic violence, upgraded with the responsibilities, and skills needed to be applied in risk assessment of radicalization that can lead to violent extremism. The protocol should set clear procedures that ensure effective communication across all multi-agency stakeholders included in the system, appointing specialized caseworkers who then receive the necessary training and experience in dealing with issues of radicalization and violent extremism.

In order to safeguard the individual that enters the referral mechanism and ensure that they are to be supported by the community in becoming more resilient to radicalization that can lead to violent extremism, **it is needed to determine rules on data protection and information sharing** on the individual risk assessment from social, psychological and health perspectives as well as the procedures for data keeping and management between the members of the referral mechanism. To this end the preventive model must “distinguish genuinely classified information from sensitive information that might be shared with some prudence.”<sup>28</sup> In this respect, sensitive personal information about the individuals cannot be shared with law enforcement so that the cooperation among the members of the mechanism and the cooperation of the individuals

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28 EU RAN, “Common P/CVE challenges in the Western Balkans and European Union,” April 2018, p8, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-wedo/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ranpapers/docs/ran\\_policy\\_practice\\_common\\_pcve\\_challenges\\_sofia\\_04042018\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-wedo/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ranpapers/docs/ran_policy_practice_common_pcve_challenges_sofia_04042018_en.pdf).

that entered in the referral mechanism will not be hindered.<sup>29</sup> Therefore all members of the preventive model for referral of individuals will sign a non-disclosure/information sharing agreement (ISA) safeguarding the individuals they work with and their personal data. According to law, the law enforcement officials cannot share classified information with the members of the referral mechanism. Considering that family members of incarcerated individuals who fall in the pre-criminal space may need to be referred to the system of prevention, or there may be other cases where law enforcement officials may deem necessary to share information, it may be assessed as appropriate for a member of the strategic board of the referral mechanism to get a security clearance for the purpose of these referrals.

The preventive model must **offer expert support to the members of the referral mechanism**. The expert support can be located on the national level and be mobile provisioning support to community-based referral mechanisms across the country. In this way the national coordination body can play an important role in both creating and sustaining preventive platforms to address radicalization on the local level considering that the country is rather decentralized.

The preventive model must recognize the different needs, interest and the different experiences by men and women, and boys and girls.<sup>30</sup> Considering that there are different tactics to recruit women and men, the role of gender and identity-related issues can have a strong impact on trajectories of radicalization to violence.<sup>31</sup> This creates an imperative for measures to prevent radicalization that can lead to violent extremism, including **referral mechanisms, to integrate a gender perspective**.<sup>32</sup>

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29 EU RAN Center of Excellence, “Ex post paper Handbook on How to set up a multi-agency structure that includes the health and social care sectors?,” 18-19 May 2016, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-papers/docs/ex-post-paper-handbook-ran-hsc-18-19-may-2016-copenhagen-dk\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/ex-post-paper-handbook-ran-hsc-18-19-may-2016-copenhagen-dk_en.pdf).

30 OSCE and ODIHR, “Recommendations and Findings: Gender Mainstreaming in Operational Responses to VERLT,” 22-23 November 2016, <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/305056?download=true>.

31 RAN Policy Paper, Developing a local prevent framework and guiding principles, EU RAN Centre of Excellence, November 2016, p. 14, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-papers/docs/policy\\_paper\\_developing\\_local\\_prevent\\_framework\\_guiding\\_112016\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/policy_paper_developing_local_prevent_framework_guiding_112016_en.pdf).

32 For a discussion of gender dynamics of and the role of women in VERLT and P/CVERLT,

## 4.1 Referral mechanism structure, role and competences

The following proposed referral mechanism structure is made of several components that have specific roles and competences in the model. The appointment of members of the different components of the referral mechanism is proposed to be done by the institutions that have been mapped as competent for being part of the preventive system. The appointment is proposed to be done by the management of the participating institutions, and by request of the Mayor and/or the Strategic board.

**National Committee for countering violent extremism and terrorism** in the proposed model provides political backing, expert support and acts as a liaison with Strategic board of the referral mechanism. The National Committee provides the necessary political backing on the central/national level by ensuring that the activities of the community-based referral mechanism operate in accordance with the National Strategy for CVE, as well as coordinates and directs the activities of the Strategic Board that are from the national strategies in this area in order to define and implement appropriate measures for CVE. The Committee is envisioned to be in a position to offer expert support directly through the National Coordinator and the Deputy Coordinator on CVE, but also through a proposed expert group of psychologists, social workers, theologians and mental health professionals that are specialized in radicalization that can lead to violent extremism. The National Committee is also expected to liaise with the Strategic Board of the referral mechanism at the local level, while collecting data on trends of radicalization, needs for training and awareness raising and improvement of public services needed to strengthen resilience to violent extremism. Finally, the National Committee should set up a monitoring and evalua-

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see, e.g., Irene Ndung'u and Mothepa Shadung, "Can a Gendered Approach Improve Responses to Violent Extremism?," Institute for Security Studies, September 2017, <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/aitwr-5.pdf>; Iffat Idris with Ayat Abdelaziz, "Women and Violent Extremism: Helpdesk Research Report," GSDRC Help Desk Research Report, 2017, [http://www.gsdr.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/HDR\\_1408.pdf](http://www.gsdr.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/HDR_1408.pdf); Emily Winterbotham and Elizabeth Pearson, "Different Cities, Shared Stories: A Five-Country Study Challenging Assumptions Around Muslim Women and CVE Interventions," RUSI Journal, 30 November 2016, <https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-journal/different-cities-shared-stories-five-country-study-challengingassumptions>; and Naureen Choudhury Fink, Sara Zeiger, and Rafia Bulai, A Man's World: Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, Hedayah and Global Center on Cooperative Security, April 2016, [http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/AMansWorld\\_FULL.pdf](http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/AMansWorld_FULL.pdf).

tion framework that will generate data, including by gender and age, on trends and should track the number and disposition of referrals (noting the types of interventions or components of broader support plans) with which service providers were involved, and include available outcome indicators such as ones related to employment, education outcomes, health outcomes, and participation in societal and community affairs. This should be set at the national level, whereas the local level strategic boards should collect data from the local level. In this way the whole model of prevention will generate data on performance and results, not just of activities implemented.

**The Expert Team** will undertake appropriate risk assessments and provide mobile support to the work of the referral boards on the local level. The team is envisaged to be composed of the following profiles: psychologist, social worker, health practitioner sensitized to the phenomena of violent extremism, theologian with an understanding of extremist narratives, a specialist on right-wing and left-wing extremism, as well as a youth worker specialized in mentoring of vulnerable youth. The referral boards will need to request support that may come in the form of training, advising or counseling. The request should be directed towards the National Committee for CVE and CT which decides when and how the expertise is provided.

**The Strategic Board** provides guidance on public relations, community awareness raising, capacity-building of referral boards, determines priorities, and decides on confidentiality, information sharing, non-disclosure of information and shares anonymous information on cases, trends and developments in the municipality with the law enforcement and the National Committee for CVE and CT. The Strategic Board also decides on budgets and establishment on new, or expansion of the scope of existing services that strengthen community resilience to radicalization. In the proposed model, the Strategic Board shares information in line with the agreed information sharing agreement and the Law on Data Protection with the police, and the police shares relevant (non-classified) information for prevention with the Strategic Board following the Law on Free Access to Information. In the proposed model, the Strategic Board is also responsible for data collection on issues pertaining to violent extremism. These include the number of cases, existing resources, and other capacities of those involved in the mechanism, as well as the

levels of trust that the members of the mechanism have within the relevant communities.

The Strategic Board is foreseen to consist of three members from the municipality: the Secretary General of the Municipality, the President of the Municipal Council, and the Head of the Sector/Department for Public Works. The Secretary General of the municipality will hold competences on legal issues, data protection, inter-agency protocols for cooperation and coordination; drafting local action plans for implementation of the Strategy for CVE; drafting an annual plan and work reports and submitting them to the National Committee. The President of Municipal Council is included as this is the body of the municipality that decides on the municipal program where the activities and services included in prevention of violent extremism are included. The President of the Municipal Council also decides on the municipal budget needed for the functioning of the referral board, the delivery of services, awareness raising and training. The Head of the Sector/Department on public works (education, social care, health) is the third member of the Strategic Board and provides analyses and monitoring of the state-of-play in the area of violent extremism in the municipality; coordination of activities of members of the referral board and the service providers; and is responsible for planning and overseeing implementation of activities by the referral board and the service providers in regard to the implementation of the support plans. Where necessary, the membership of the Strategic Board can be extended to the representative of the police and a representative of the Commission for Inter-Ethnic Relations or any other assessed body as having importance for the political backing of the operation of the referral mechanism of individuals vulnerable to violent extremism.

**The Case Management Board/Case Assessment Board** is at the core of the proposed model and is made of six professionals (one psychologist (p); one social worker (p); one health practitioner (p); two religious community representatives, one from the two largest faiths – Christianity and Islam (p); and one community member (representing the specific ethnic community to which the individual referred to the preventive model belongs). Five of the six professionals are permanent members of the board whereas the community representative is interchangeable depending on the individual that is being assessed and supported through the preventive model.

Individuals drawn to extremist milieus have often been previously diagnosed as having a range of complex psychological problems. The board competences are to appoint a case manager and team; to conduct a risk assessment and to decide on a support plan for the individual that has entered the referral mechanism. When a person enters voluntarily to the referral mechanism, the professional members of the case management/assessment board appoint a case manager from the members of the board and two members of her/his team that will conduct a psychosociological risk assessment of radicalization for the referred person. Based on the assessment and the presentation of the findings to the board, the members decide where the individual is to be referred and what type of support the mechanism should provide, determine how the monitoring and evaluation of progress will be assessed, and will charge the case manager with a plan for reporting back on results.

**The Case manager** is one of the case management/assessment board members in the proposed model. All members can and will be case managers for different cases. The case manager works in a team together with two other assessment board members. The case manager heads and organises the expert team work; conducts the case assessment, provides individual and the community assessment, develops individual support plan including specific goals, tasks and the task implementers, and finally oversees the implementation.

Once the essential psychosociological risk assessment is conducted and the Referral Management Board decides on a support plan, the individual is referred **to services/service providers** for counselling, training, networking, etc. CRPM research on perceptions of front-line workers and community officials from Skopje, Kumanovo, Tetovo and Gostivar on radicalization leading to violent extremism<sup>33</sup> shows that high school students struggle with identity problems, failed integration, feelings of alienation, marginalization, and discrimination which become the main reasons why youth tend to accept propagation of radical ideologies and the use of violence; it also suggests that they lack problem-solving, social skills and critical-thinking skills with low impulse control. Therefore, different services and service providers such as psychologists, mental health workers, youth centers, and sport centers among others can assist vulnerable individuals in channeling feelings and frustrations, as well as

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33 Filip Stojkovski, Ivan Stefanoski, Kristijan Aleksovski (2019), *Baseline study: Perceptions*

facilitate networking and social inclusion. In this manner, early warning signs of radicalization will be identified and mitigated. Service providers in this context can be from public institutions, companies and CSOs that offer programming and activities that can mitigate the factors that make community members vulnerable to accepting the propagation of radical ideologies and use of violence.

**Community Action Teams (CAT) on CVE** have been established in three pilot municipalities: Chair, Kichevo and Gostivar.<sup>34</sup> The role of the CAT is involves typical prevention programming designed to build community resilience and social cohesion to resist the appeal of radicalization that can lead to violent extremism. These teams make proposals to the municipal council involving decisions, programs and other acts that are of importance to the prevention and countering of violent extremism. The CATs facilitate discussions with the municipal council on the proposed decisions, including a proposed financial plan for implementation of activities; raise awareness about the threat of violent extremism in neighborhoods; and provide public information on all important issues for preventing and countering violent extremism.


**Community Working Groups (CWGs)** have been formed in the municipalities of Kumanovo, Veles, Gazi Baba and Tetovo. One of their roles is to implement educational activities and to promote critical thinking, nonviolent opposition and protest, exchange information and organize events, public discussions, debates that raise awareness and community resilience to radicalization that can lead to violent extremism.<sup>35</sup>

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*of front-line school workers and community officials from Skopje, Kumanovo, Tetovo and Gostivar on radicalization leading to violent extremism*, ed. Marija Risteska, CRPM

34 The mechanism is developed by Search for Common Ground within the project 'Strengthening the resilience of local communities to violent extremism in Macedonia' financed by the British Embassy and the Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands in Skopje

35 The mechanism is developed by Civil center for freedom within the project 'Communities against violent extremism', financed by the Embassy of USA



### COMMUNITY ACTION TEAMS

LIAISES WITH STRATEGIC BOARD  
 PROPOSES FOR NEW SERVICES TO BE ESTABLISHED  
 ADVISES FOR THE DIVERSIFICATION OF SERVICES AVAILABLE  
 ADVISES FOR FINANCING TO BE PROVIDED BY MUNICIPALITY FOR P/CVE ACTIVITIES

CATs  
CWGs

### COMMUNITY WORKING GROUPS

PROVIDES SERVICES FOR INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT PLAN IMPLEMENTATION  
 PROVIDES COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

## 4.2. Referral process

The Referral Board should meet at least once a month and extraordinary meetings may be held when it is deemed necessary. The location of their meetings can be in the municipality or in the premises of any of the board members. The Strategic Board is otherwise recommended to meet in the municipality's premises.

With consideration that a whole-of-the-society approach is applied to the referral mechanism of individuals vulnerable to radicalization in a way that not only targets vulnerable groups, but is directed towards the whole community, the referral process is thus implemented in following three phases.

### Phase 1: Initiation

The first phase is the initiation, which encompasses the referral of a person to the referral mechanism followed by an initial meeting. The initiation can take multiple avenues such as using an online form, calling a hotline or being referred by a different stakeholder group to the referral mechanism.

#### Step 1: Referral to the system

**Referral by online form:** The referral form can be available on the web site of the municipality with a clear statement that the referral is completely confidential and any information given in the mechanism will be accessible only by the Referral Board. The referral may be treated as anonymous, but contact information must be provided so that the Referral Board can contact the person making the referral. Furthermore, there should be a clear disclaimer that the information will not be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies unless there is a direct risk to public safety, in which case the municipality is obliged to cooperate with law enforcement. The referral form should also contain information on what follows after the referral. This includes a description of the process that outlines that the individual that is referred will be approached and if s/he agrees to be supported through the referral mechanism then a risk assessment will be undertaken and an individual support plan will be developed, tailor made to the needs of the referred individual.

**Hotline / Helpline:** for the purpose of initiating the referral mechanism, the municipality can open a special local hotline, or support line/help-

line through which it can “provide important psychological support and advice to families, relatives and friends of individuals who are linked to violent extremism.”<sup>36</sup> Alternatively, the municipality can use an existing line, for example that which is in place to report family violence. Different actors, such as civil society organizations, operate these hotlines/helplines and may need to undergo additional training on violent extremism. Operating these hotlines/helplines in Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish and Romani languages is recommended in order to create trust and psychological support, and to better provide expert counselling on how to act and who to turn to in a given situation.

**Referral from an institution:** when a teacher, health practitioner, or a coach in a sport club, notices that an individual may be vulnerable to radicalization then s/he can call the municipality, write an email, or use an online referral form to refer this person to the system for support. Such avenues could include from sports clubs, religious or other community centers, or from front-line professionals such as teachers, youth workers or social workers using the already available mechanisms within their system of operation. In this regard, it is recommended that schools include the option of the student to be referred to the preventive model as one of the pedagogical measures. For this channel of referral to be formally institutionalized, the schools will need to change the statute of the school. In turn, the centers for social work can decide on different measures and refer beneficiaries to different services including the municipal preventive model for more comprehensive support.

For all of these referral channels to function, awareness raising is needed in the community to be able to recognize behaviors that can indicate vulnerability to radicalization. At the same time it is acknowledged that teachers, social workers, health practitioners, religious leaders, sports, cultural and other professionals need specific training for understanding violent extremism and the associated risks.

## **Step 2: Initial meeting**

Once an individual is referred, the Referral Board needs to set up an initial meeting. On the first meeting the individual should be encouraged (and incentivized) to take advantage of the interventions and the

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<sup>36</sup> OSCE 2019, “**Understanding Referral Mechanisms in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: Navigating challenges and protecting human rights – A focus on South-Eastern Europe**”

support offered through the program. The objective of the meeting is to obtain voluntary consent from the individual. Where the referred individual is a juvenile, consent of a parent or guardian is to be required in order for him or her to be assessed and receive any intervention through the mechanism.

Once the referred individual consents to participate in the system, then the second phase commences.

## **Phase 2: Assessment**

The second phase is focused on producing a non-discriminatory risk and needs assessment of the individuals that have been referred to the referral mechanism system and have agreed to be supported by the community. In this phase, assessment tools (which need to be developed tailored to each specific context) are applied to assess the risks of radicalization and identify needs to decrease vulnerability to radicalization for the purpose of developing a tailored support plan for the individual.

### **Step 1: Risk assessment**

The assessment framework encompasses interviews with the referred individual, family members, peers, and teachers; social network observations; and the case files of social, health, or school front-line workers. These sources provide a multidimensional and objective evaluation of an individual. Since some of the sources are secondary, relying on the files and work of the different institutions included in the model with the individual prior to him/her being referred to the referral mechanism, the institutions need to sign an information sharing agreement that regulates privacy of the personal data shared between referral board members. A draft information sharing agreement is included in Annex 1.

The assessment includes application of evidence-based methods that combine trauma treatment with risk assessment and therapy methods such as Life Psychology, Risk Need Responsivity, etc. The assessment should determine the factors that can influence an individual's vulnerability to radicalization. To this end, the volume of literature on radicalization and violent extremism shows that there is no one factor, but a combination of factors that are conducive to vulnerability to radicalization. A common indicator to radicalization is individual's shifts in behavior,

ideology, and/or social network.<sup>37</sup> However, in some intervention models few tools are applied that focus specifically on violent extremism. For example, TRAP 18 (Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol) exists to track the long-term prognosis of individual actors; HCR 20 is a commonly used model to assess the risk of violence without a specific focus on extremist violence; whereas VERA-2 takes social and contextual aspects of the individual's environment into consideration and the MLG (Multi level guidance) is a set of structured professional judgment guidelines for assessing group-based violence consisting of four domains of risk factors: (1) Individual, (2) Individual-Group, (3) Group and (4) Group-Societal. However, it is assessed that all these violent extremism-related risk assessment tools are novel, not yet verified and need further evaluation before being recommended to be transferred elsewhere.

In the assessment all members of the referral board might be included or an assessment team made of the case manager and two other members (depending on the case). For both options there is a need to appoint a case manager prior to the commencement of the risk assessment. The case manager will manage the assessment, the development of the support plan, the implementation of the support plan and the monitoring and reporting of the progress achieved. The case manager is also a member of the referral board. The case manager serves as the single point of contact with the individual, family, and others in the local community.<sup>38</sup> A single point of contact avoids the danger of undermining both the efficiency of and trust in the mechanism that might be posed if members of the local community are approached by multiple individuals about a particular case.<sup>39</sup>

The outcome of the assessment should lead to the development of a support plan that is tailor made to the specific needs of the assessed individual.

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37 GCTF, *Initiative to Address the Life Cycle of Radicalization to Violence, Neuchâtel Memorandum on Good Practices for Juvenile Justice in a Counterterrorism Context*, <https://theiij.org/wp-content/uploads/English-Neuchâtel-Memorandum-on-Juvenile-Justice.pdf>

38 OSCE 2019, “**Understanding Referral Mechanisms in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: Navigating challenges and protecting human rights – A focus on South-Eastern Europe**”

39 EU RAN Center of Excellence, “Handbook on How to Set Up a Multi-Agency Structure”, available online: [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/about-ran/ran-h-and-sc/docs/ran\\_hsc\\_policy\\_mawr\\_report\\_sarma\\_26032019\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-h-and-sc/docs/ran_hsc_policy_mawr_report_sarma_26032019_en.pdf)

## **Step 2: Development of support plan**

The support plan is tailored to the identified vulnerabilities and should take into account the age, gender, cultural background, the socio-cultural characteristics of the community the individual belongs to, as well as be primarily based on the risk factors that are identified in the assessment. The support plan should outline the services to which the individual is referred, the frequency the individual should attend them and the short-term and long-term objectives of the support plan as well as the methods of monitoring and collection of data for measuring progress of the support provided to the individual.

The services that should be considered to be included in the support plan are the following: family or psychosocial counselling; mentoring programs (ideological and/or theological); training and recreation (sports, arts, music, theater, vocational, increasing employability skills, assistance with job placement); conflict mediation, anger management, tolerance and diversity management programs; and finally for some individuals addiction treatment (drugs, alcohol, gambling and etc.). In many municipalities, such services do not exist and therefore the community action teams should recommend to the strategic board the establishment of additional services based on the needs.

The services available in the municipalities where the Educate to Prevent project is implemented have been identified and a roster of services has been prepared and presented in Annex 2 of the model.

## **Phase 3: Support**

The support phase is the last and encompasses implementation of the support plan that has been developed in the previous phase and monitoring and evaluation that takes stock of the progress achieved. The support phase is the most important as it is during this phase all vulnerabilities to radicalization are addressed. The success of this phase can lead to reversing radicalization processes in a community and the prevention of violent extremism as a phenomenon.

## **Step 1: Implementation of support plan**

The implementation of the support plan is managed by the case manager but conducted by a number of professionals, practitioners (social, health, and youth workers; religious or other mentors; sports, life, or oth-

er coaches; teachers; CSO activists, etc.) working in community-based services. These stakeholders can deliver separate interventions or the whole support plan. The support offered through the referral system will be delivered in a predefined time frame. However, the process of supporting the individual vulnerable to radicalization will be monitored and the support plan will be accordingly adapted to the needs of the beneficiary, including a possible revision of the time frame.

## Step 2: Report on progress

A comprehensive plan for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is vital to ensuring the effective support of individuals vulnerable to radicalization. An M&E framework should track, including by gender and age, the number and disposition of referrals (noting the types of interventions or components of broader support plans) with which service providers were involved, and include available outcome indicators such as ones related to employment, education, health, and participation in societal and community affairs.<sup>40</sup>

The ambition is to gather statistical data, but also qualitative data on referred individuals, including information gathered by questionnaires completed by the referred individual, relatives, and peers. This should inform trends analysis on the number, character, and level of violent incidents and of extremist rhetoric used by multiple stakeholders in the community; but also the response the community has provided in countering this phenomenon. Such efforts will contribute to resolving an often-noted problem for CVE policymakers in the Republic of North Macedonia, which is the unavailability of reliable and consistent data. Since the adoption of the National Strategy for CVE in February 2018, the municipalities have become responsible for contributing to the institutional response to this phenomenon. Municipal authorities are required to prepare local action plans and together with local action teams to contribute to the implementation of the National Strategy for CVE. However, the findings of the CRPM research show that municipalities are remotely aware of their role in countering violent extremism.<sup>41</sup>


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40 OSCE 2019, “**Understanding Referral Mechanisms in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: Navigating challenges and protecting human rights – A focus on South-Eastern Europe**”

41 Filip Stojkovski, Ivan Stefanoski, Kristijan Aleksovski (2019), *Baseline study: Perceptions of front-line school workers and community officials from Skopje, Kumanovo, Tetovo and*

Setting up a system for data gathering and data keeping at the local level as well as regular reporting and analysis of the trends on national level would be critical. To this end, and in order for the response to violent extremism to be effective, it is important to establish links between the local level referral mechanism and the National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism. This will inevitably improve the current situation in which the vague understanding of the role of the municipality regarding its information collection on VE is seen to be problematic and could represent a significant weakness for overall implementation of the National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism at the local level.<sup>42</sup>

### Visual presentation of the referral process



Source: Author's own presentation

## 5. Funding the referral mechanism

Considering that institutions on the central and local level will implement the preventive model for referring individuals to be supported in the process of addressing vulnerabilities to radicalization, it will necessitate mixed financing from both central and local budgets.

As in other issues, the model financing has to be considered from the administrative and program level. At administrative level the structure of the model will require that the National Committee for CVE and CT will need to include the expert and political support for the preventive model under its budget, whereas the municipalities themselves will need to foresee funding for the referral mechanism on local level. At the

*Gostivar on radicalization leading to violent extremism*, ed. Marija Risteska CRPM

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

program level, the National Committee for CVE and CT will need to budget funding for awareness raising and capacity building activities on both the local and central level, whereas the municipalities will need to budget funding of the services to support individuals who are vulnerable to radicalization. Considering that the National Committee does not have a budget of its own, we recommend that the government make such a budget available as payments from the General Secretariat of the Government tend to complicate procedures.

However, for the purpose of determining the budget needed for policy makers or independent policy development institutions, a cost estimate of the preventive model is needed, so that an objective account of how much funding the model will require. The costing will need to take into account the new responsibilities, activities and roles that are upgraded with the development of the preventive model. It is recommended that the costing is conducted in the period April-October so that the estimated costs can be included in the new budget cycle for the next year. The costing can determine a funding plan of 5 years where all costs can be distributed across the time period in order to ensure sustainability of the intervention.


The policy development workshops organized within the E2P project for the purpose of developing the proposed model have discussed the modes of funding. While in most municipalities the shared responsibility in funding the preventive model between the central and local government is preferred and accepted in two municipalities, Tetovo and Gostivar, where the workshops were organized, some additional considerations were recommended. Namely, considering the current situation in Gostivar with the municipal council, the local stakeholders recommended that a central government intervention would be needed in order for the proposed budget for prevention of violent extremism to be adopted by the municipal council. In Tetovo, adopting a budget for the preventive model will not be hindered, but its implementation is expected to be problematic, as most stakeholders have problems to collect payments from the municipality. Special accounts or earmarked funds for the purpose of the functioning of the preventive model were therefore recommended to avoid the possibility of the municipality reallocating the foreseen funds for the preventive model for other purposes.

## 6. Awareness raising and training

In order for the preventive model to be operational, awareness of the whole community needs to be raised on phenomenon of violent extremism and the process of radicalization that might lead to it. Additionally, awareness is needed on the availability of the mechanism for referring individuals for intervention and support to decrease vulnerability to radicalization. In this respect, a holistic approach is needed which emphasizes the need not to stigmatize any individual or group, but to increase a broad understanding of violent extremism as a phenomenon and the existence of resources and tools to address it, including intervention through the referral mechanism. To this end, awareness raising campaigns can be effective in demystifying stigmas and taboos among the relevant communities and other key stakeholders such as social workers, teachers, and health professionals, coaches, parents who might be reluctant to participate in the initiative. Based on the global and EU-led best practices on referral mechanisms for preventing violent extremism, such a campaign could include online resources, including FAQ sheets, videos, trainings, or public forums. The insufficient awareness about the nature and contextualization of the phenomenon of violent extremism in the local community, in addition to the sensitivity about the issue from the community members, can present serious obstacles to the operationalization and the success of the preventive model on the local level. Therefore, working with media on awareness raising is an important precondition for successful operation of the preventive model.

Another serious obstacle identified in other contexts is both the lack of qualified professional staff and insufficient education of the staff for tackling vulnerabilities of radicalization that reflects a general unfavorable situation in the institutions included in the referral mechanism. Therefore, training the referral boards is one of the priorities prior to creation of the referral mechanism.

The training needs assessment was conducted with the relevant representatives (from the local municipalities, CSOs, centers for social work, media, schools, health centers and religious communities) from mapped institutions that should be included in the referral mechanism. About 30 representatives were consulted within the policy development workshops organized in Gostivar, Tetovo, Kumanovo and Skopje. secondary school with experience in administrations.



The assessment shows that 89% of participants have *participated in trainings related to interethnic integration, conflict resolution, coping with violent and/or deviant behavior, getting acquainted with the processes of indoctrination and radicalization, etc. in the last 5 years*. Only 11% did not participate in such training. What is more, one can observe that specialization in these issues is ongoing as eleven of the participants have participated in two trainings, seven of them in three specialized trainings, whereas three of them in four specialized trainings (see list below). The methods applied so far in building capacity for addressing radicalization and violent extremism is through training, workshops, lectures, and a small number of examples through cooperation among schools, exchanges at roundtable discussions and/or promotion activities.

Table 1: Trainings attended by relevant stakeholders

Type of relevant training attended	Organizer
Inter-ethnic integration in education of youth	USAID, MCGO, MoES
Training for front-line workers (teachers, pedagogues, psychologist) and parents-educate to prevent	CRPM, CED, NEXUS, IOM
Prevention of violent behavior; Workshop on prevention of violent extremism and radicalization, terrorism, extremism, radicalism; Prevention of violence extremism; Violent extremism and radicalization; Radicalization and extremism; "Building bridges" Safe schools; Mediation for change; LIVE Initiative "train the trainer"; conflict resolution; Human/child trafficking, mediation, coexistence, Leaders Against Intolerance and Violent Extremism (LIVE) training; debate on extremism	OSCE
No hate speech, multiculturalism, peaceful conflict resolution	CID

Workshop on counter narratives	Hedayah
Extremism and radicalization	South Community Center
Prevention of terrorism	Step by Step
Prevention of radicalization	Women Without Borders
Communication without violence	NGO Doverba
Conflict resolution	CIVIL
The municipal council and inter-ethnic relations	NDI
Training on hate crime against Muslims	ODIHR
Type of relevant training attended	Organizer
Inter-ethnic integration in education of youth	USAID, MCGO, MoES
Training for front-line workers (teachers, pedagogues, psychologist) and parents-educate to prevent	CRPM, CED, NEXUS, IOM
Prevention of violent behavior; Workshop on prevention of violent extremism and radicalization, terrorism, extremism, radicalism; Prevention of violence extremism; Violent extremism and radicalization; Radicalization and extremism; "Building bridges" Safe schools; Mediation for change; LIVE Initiative "train the trainer"; conflict resolution; Human/child trafficking, mediation, coexistence, Leaders Against Intolerance and Violent Extremism (LIVE) training; debate on extremism	OSCE
No hate speech, multiculturalism, peaceful conflict resolution	CID
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Prevention of radicalization	Women Without Borders
Communication without violence	NGO Doverba
Conflict resolution	CIVIL
The municipal council and inter-ethnic relations	NDI
Training on hate crime against Muslims	ODIHR

Source: TNA performed during policy development workshops, Author's own presentation

Considering that countering violent extremism (CVE) is “the full spectrum of possible interventions along the radicalization process, **including preventive measures** (‘PVE’), as well as post-radicalization restorative measures, such as de-radicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration”<sup>43</sup>, future trainings to be organized in this area must focus on making a difference between these areas of engagement; the procedures, skills and tools (i.e. needs assessment and risk assessment) on how to deal with the referred person; as well as skills on how to present the benefits of the preventive model for referring individuals that are vulnerable to radicalization. The professionals included in the refer-

<sup>43</sup> Hedayah, Introduction to Counter Violent Extremism, Resources on Key concepts and Definitions, November 2018, p.6.

ral boards need to undertake specialized training on how to conduct risk assessments that adhere to Do-No-Harm principles. Yet, as the EU RAN's Health and Social Care Working Group has recently noted, "[a] common misconception of risk assessments is that they are complex or require substantial formal training. While practitioners would need to become familiar with such tools, it is important to make clear that these tools are used as guidance, together with other relevant information".<sup>44</sup> The training needs assessment in this respect determined that the training should be participatory and inclusive, should focus on the relevant practitioners, and should be professionally developed, prepared, and delivered by competent trainers that are experts in the field. The team of trainers should be multi-cultural and should have excellent understanding and application of the Do-No-Harm Approach. The trainers should have clear and understandable presentations avoiding prejudices, instead promoting tolerance and difference of opinion and using holistic approaches and methods of non-formal education.

In terms of topics where capacity building is needed, the participants of the policy development workshops identified the following areas: how to deal with deviant attitudes and radicalization; how to deal with polarization (political, ethnic, religious and etc.); networking and cooperation among institutions; skills for recognition of signs of radicalization and violent extremism; inter-ethnic integration; conflict resolution; and safety on internet.

## **7. Risk management**

The main challenge for the effective prevention of violent extremism in other countries is poor inter-institutional cooperation at both the central and local level and from the strategic and operational domain, as well as the inability to recognize the benefits of such cooperation. This reality requires a need for a systematic approach in which promotion of multisectoral cooperation and the development of protocols for the work of the relevant institutions and organizations at the local level is emphasized. To this end, the proposed model establishes links between the local level referral mechanism and the National Committee for CVE and CT.

The second challenge for the effective prevention of the violent extrem-

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<sup>44</sup> EU RAN, "Risk Assessment around Lone Actors", p. 6

ism in other countries is the resistance and blowback from communities that does not want their members to be stigmatized. Therefore, the proposed model recommends, together with the Do-No-Harm approach, to use non-discriminatory risk assessment tools to identify individuals who demonstrate signs of radicalization to violence, including for the purpose of tailored intervention programs for individuals before he/she commit any acts of violence or terrorism. With this in mind, the OSCE **“Understanding Referral Mechanisms in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism”** guidelines recommend careful consideration of the naming and branding of the referral mechanism, expanding it to address a wider set of violence-related and/or safeguarding issues of concern to the relevant community (i.e. youth delinquency, family violence, school violence such as bullying, etc.). Adopting such a risk mitigating strategy can help avoid stigmatizing individuals and communities belonging to a particular religious, ethnic, or other identity group by eschewing labels such as “radicalized”, “violent extremist”, and even “terrorist”.<sup>45</sup> It would also help in addressing the risks around sustainability of the referral mechanism in municipalities where only a small number of referrals are expected.

## 8. Operationalization of the model – findings from policy development workshops

The proposed referral mechanism is a general framework that needs to be adapted to the circumstances of each municipality. Considering that not all municipalities have identical political, financing or institutional capacities, the operationalization of the referral mechanism would differ. Since the implementation of the Educate 2 Prevent project in the municipalities of Aerodrom, Arachinovo, Gazi Baba, Grad Skopje, Chair, Tetovo, Gostivar, Saraj, and Kumanovo, the project team organized policy development workshops where the referral mechanism was presented and discussed with relevant stakeholders (municipal representatives, health and social centers representatives, school, CSO and religious communities representatives) with a purpose to adjust the model to the needs and circumstances in each of the targeted municipalities.

<sup>45</sup> EU Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Centre of Excellence, “Handbook on How to Set Up a Multi-Agency Structure that Includes the Health and Social Care Sectors?”, 18–19 May 2016, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-papers/docs/ex-post-paper-handbook-ran-hsc-18-19-may-2016-copenhagen-dk\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/ex-post-paper-handbook-ran-hsc-18-19-may-2016-copenhagen-dk_en.pdf).

The following is a proposal for tailor made operationalization of the model in each of the municipalities. It includes discussion on the current situation in the targeted municipalities, the capacity and assessment in place as well as risks and adaptation of the model's structure to reflect on the needs of the municipality and its citizens.

## 8.1. Gostivar

The radicalization phenomenon is not internalized in Gostivar's community. The community representatives in Gostivar are aware that is dangerous to categorize, generalize or link the phenomenon with one ethnic or religious group. They representatives, however, still have exhibit difficulties in understanding the phenomenon and detecting it in their community. Awareness raising and training is therefore highly needed.

The municipality is facing difficulties: due to the political divisions in the council, relations between the Mayor and the municipality towards the majority in the Council is problematic. This results in a failure to make important decisions that are relevant to building resilience and preventing radicalization. A whole-of-the-community approach is needed. This is operationalized through engaging different parts of society in various institutional platforms such as the Youth Council, which is active in Gostivar.

The municipality has experience in successfully coordinating multiple agencies in tackling domestic violence; the existing mechanism can be used as best practices as it was established on a voluntary basis with the communication between the various institutions with a role in the mechanism being defined through protocols. The proposed model will upgrade the existing structure.

At the same time the stakeholders positively assessed the proposed referral mechanism, but have concerns about the level of awareness and capacity for the community to identify signs of radicalization. They have recommended that all relevant institutions (i.e. schools, hospitals, centers for social works, cultural and sport facilities) revise their statutes regulating responsibility to refer individuals to the preventive model who demonstrate violent or anti-social **behavior**. Only in this way the model can be expected to be operational in Gostivar. Furthermore, the stakeholders assessed the ongoing politicization in the municipality as a risk to the effectiveness of the referral mechanism.

In terms of structure and institutions included in the system for referring individuals who demonstrate signs of radicalized behavior, Gostivar participants suggested including a psychiatrist from the health home in Gostivar in the referral board, as the center for mental health is not available in the municipality. The inclusion of the youth council in the strategic board of the preventive model is another specificity of the municipality. Furthermore, the participants within the workshop determined a list of services to which individuals vulnerable to radicalization can be referred and thus become part of the model. See specific visualization of the Gostivar preventive model in Annex 2.

## **8.2. Tetovo**

In Tetovo, the phenomenon of radicalization is instigated from several factors, some related to fragile community relations, inter-ethnic conflicts, and religious intolerance and segregation in schools.

In Tetovo, execution of municipal financing is problematic and therefore the participants of the policy development workshop requested that the referral board activities be financed through earmarked funds directly provided for that purpose on a special account. Participants also noted that the experience of women's organizations as mediators between institutions and the individuals that are vulnerable to radicalization should be used, as well as their knowledge and experience in operating a help line through which initiation of the process can be done and/or advice can be provided.

The policy development workshop participants evaluated the proposed model as very useful for addressing the radicalization phenomenon in their community. Specifically, the collaboration between the different institutions in the community was assessed as instrumental for proactive inclusion of the community in activities to tackle violent extremism. The proposed model structure was seen as adequate for inclusion of all relevant actors, ensuring teamwork and gender responsiveness.

The participants identified the municipal problems with financial management as critical to the functioning of the preventive model. Namely the participants had doubts that the municipality will provide sustained financial support and the adoption of other possibilities for financing the model (central funding or earmarked grants) were proposed.

The role of the police is inevitably important in Tetovo and community

policing should be strengthened, as in the case of Kumanovo, towards preventing violent extremism. For signs of radicalization to be identified, the community needs capacity building and awareness raising as well as a protocol or instruction on how to inform the police of their concerns. To this end, enhancing the role of media in information and awareness raising is instrumental.

The participants considered that the inclusion of civil society in the strategic board will allow for programs and initiatives on prevention of radicalization to be adapted to the needs of the citizens. In the strategic board, inclusion of the municipal committee for community relations was proposed as beneficial for the functioning of the model, as well as the parent's council.

Finally, the participants raised issues such as continuous capacity building and the creation of a knowledge management system as a mitigation strategy for the turn over of municipal staff and for ensuring sustainability of the preventive model.

See specific visualization of the Tetovo preventive model in Annex 3.

### **8.3. Kumanovo**

Unlike the other municipalities in the country, cooperation in Kumanovo between the local government and non-governmental organizations prevails. After the 2001 insurgency, relations between the communities were fragile, people were divided, but with the joint work of non-governmental organizations and the municipality, this polarization is being managed effectively.

The discussion during the policy development workshop showed that there are municipal structures that can be used for risk management, such as the socio-economic council within which the preventive model can function. The council is set up to function as a multi-agency body uniting representatives from the business sector, the municipality, the labor and employers' associations, CSOs, etc. Considering that one of the issues the municipality is facing is marginalization and exclusion of certain communities, potentially making them more vulnerable to radicalization, the preventive model needs to be attached to other social cohesion mechanisms at the local level. The participants proposed that the local economic council could fill the place of such a mechanism that facilitates inclusion. The strategic board in Kumanovo was there-

fore suggested to be substituted with the local economic council, whereas the referral board could function/have a role of a commission/body within the council.

The need for capacity building and awareness raising was also identified as an issue in Kumanovo. Participants noted a need to understand that CVE is “the full spectrum of possible interventions along the radicalization process, **including preventive measures (‘PVE’)**, as well as post-radicalization restorative measures, such as de-radicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration”<sup>46</sup>. . Again, in Kumanovo participants noted their need for support with developing protocols and procedures for determining which cases an individual would be referred to the police, while accepting that the model is preventive and targets the pre-criminal phase of radicalization processes. It is worthwhile taking into account the fact that community policing was strengthened in Kumanovo with specific training on violent extremism, which is not the case in the rest of the targeted municipalities.

In terms of risks, the participants considered that the structure of the model is rather extensive and might become complicated as it will involve coordination of many institutions in regards to information sharing and data protection.

The participants foresaw inclusion of many sport, cultural and religious communities as well as media that can all have a role as a community support to the individuals vulnerable to radicalization that are included in the preventive model. These stakeholders are presented in annex 4 in the roster of services.

## 8.4. Skopje

Skopje is considered as the stronghold of religious and nationalist radicalization. Even before the conflict in 2001, but especially in the aftermath, inter-ethnic and religious cleavages were not managed successfully, and as a result created fertile soil for religious and ethnic radicalization leading to violence. The fragile community relations have contributed towards religious intolerance between the largest two religious communities in the municipality – Muslims and Orthodox Christians. Furthermore, the animosity between local members of sport fan

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<sup>46</sup> Hedayah, Introduction to Counter Violent Extremism, Resources on Key concepts and Definitions, November 2018, p.6.

groups, which have a history of ethnic and religious hatred, makes the municipality of Chair and the surrounding municipalities susceptible to inter-ethnic and inter-religious clashes. Lastly, segregation in schools is one of the driving factors that contributes towards radicalization leading to violent extremism.

The risk of working in support of individuals vulnerable to radicalization is that these individuals could be stigmatized by different ethnic, religious, or political groups and therefore the whole-of-community approach is needed so that all local stakeholders invest efforts to prevent radicalization and violent extremism. This is of utmost importance for ethnically and religiously mixed municipalities such as the city of Skopje municipalities: Chair, Gazi Baba, Centar, Aerodrom, and Saraj.

Another risk noted by the participants in the policy development workshop in Skopje is the initiation of the process of referral which was contested because the level of civic activism in the city is rather low. Participants expressed concern that citizens will not be proactive and refer a person they know to the preventive model unless the awareness and capacity is raised, in addition to the activation of some specific actors such as the neighborhood (rural and urban) units. However, in some municipalities of the City of Skopje, such as Chair and Saraj, it was suggested to direct awareness raising and capacity building efforts to tea houses which are hubs where male community members gather together.

In order to mitigate this risk it is needed to work closely with the media so that they can create content and inform citizens of the signs of radicalization as well as the community options available for decreasing the vulnerability to radicalization.

Participants noted that the referral mechanism must be simple in order to be functional: individuals cannot be lost in an administrative labyrinth. To this end, it is important that the institutions are well connected and their roles and responsibilities are regulated with protocols. Moreover, in the Skopje municipalities where there is no branch office of the center for social work, one social worker needs to be designated to be part of the referral board of the municipality. All members of the referral board should be given appropriate remuneration in order for the system to work.

## **Annex 1: Information sharing agreement**

Сите институции и јавни установи кои се вклучени во превентивниот модел за упатување индивидуи со цел градење отпорност кон радикализација која може да доведе до насилан екстремизам ја склучуваат оваа:

# **СПОГОДБА ЗА ЗАШТИТА НА ПОДАТОЦИ И (НЕ)СПОДЕЛУВАЊЕ**

## **Член 1**

Доверливоста и заштитата на информациите на индивидуите кои се влезени во системот на упатување се одговорност на членовите на Одборот за упатување и раководителот на случајот.

Тие се одговорни за сите активности на поддршка на индивидуата која е влезена во системот на упатување.

Членовите на Одборот за упатување и раководителот на случајот се должни веднаш да го известат Стратешкиот одбор и Дирекцијата за заштита на податоци при сомнеж за неовластено користење или обид за неовластено користење на податоци за индивидуата од било кое лице кое не е член на одборот за упатување или е член на безбедносните структури без налог за пристап до личните податоци за индивидуата која е влезена во системот за упатување.

Вашите податоци, оценката на ризик и планот за поддршка се безбедни.

## **Член 2**

Институциите кои се членови на превентивниот модел за упатување на индивидуи ги споделуваат податоците од личните досиеја на индивидуите кои се влезени во системот на упатување.

Институциите кои се членови на превентивниот модел за упатување на индивидуи ќе вршат соодветна промена на сите информации поврзани со индивидуата, а во согласност со оценките на ризик направени во рамки на системот за управување и поддршката понудена на индивидуата за градење на отпорност кон радикализација.

Институциите кои се членови на превентивниот модел за упатување на индивидуи во ниту еден случај не смеат да ја репродуцираат содржината од личните досиеја на индивидуите кои се влезени во системот на упатување и да ги користат за други потреби/цели кои не се поврзани со поддршката која индивидуите треба да ја добијат со цел градење отпорност кон радикализација која може да доведе до насилан екстремизам.

За членовите на превентивниот модел од најголемо значење е безбедноста, здравјето и благосостојбата на индивидуите кои се влезени во системот за упатување со цел унапредување на нивната отпорност кон радикализација.

### Член 3

Доколку дојде до прекршување на било која од заложите утврдени со оваа спогодба се суспендира членството во одборот за упатување на членот во било кое време, без претходна најава, и на кој било начин ќе се прекине пристапот до личните податоци на индивидуата влезена во системот на упатување.

Институциите кои се членови на превентивниот модел за упатување на индивидуи се согласуваат и имаат право да го суспендираат нивниот претставник доколку:

1. недвосмислено ги прекршуваат заложите од оваа спогодба;
2. неактивност од страна на членот на одборот или
3. експлицитно непостапување во проценката на ризици или поддршката која се дава на индивидуите кои се влезени во системот на упатување.

Секој член на одборот за упатување се согласува дека во кое било време, без претходна најава, може да биде суспендиран доколку било која од претходно наведените ситуации настанат.

### Член 4

Членовите на превентивниот модел освен информации од личните досиеја, оценките на ризик и плановите за поддршка кои се споделени со останатите институции и установи вклучени во превентивниот модел, исто така, прибира информации за комуникацијата и однесувањето на индивидуите вклучени во системот на упату-

Информациите може да бидат користени од страна на Стратешкиот одбор и безбедносните служби, но во анонимна форма за статистичка анализа на трендови со цел подготовка на мерки и активности за превенција и справување со радикализација која може да доведе до насилан екстремизам.


## Gostivar Roster of Services

Општина	Име на организација	Дејност	Контакт
Гостивар	Културно здружение „Дунек“ Гостивар	Театар „ДУНЕК“ Гостивар	Театар Дунек: <a href="https://www.facebook.com/teatar.dunek">https://www.facebook.com/teatar.dunek</a>  Културно здружение Дунек: <a href="https://www.facebook.com/%D0%9A%D1%83%D0%B-D1%82%D1%83%D1%80%D0%BD%0%BE-%D0%B7%D0%B4%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D0%94%D0%A3%D0%9D%D0%95%D0%9A-%D0%93%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%80-418230078280844/">https://www.facebook.com/%D0%9A%D1%83%D0%B-D1%82%D1%83%D1%80%D0%BD%0%BE-%D0%B7%D0%B4%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D0%94%D0%A3%D0%9D%D0%95%D0%9A-%D0%93%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%80-418230078280844/</a>
Гостивар	Центар За Современа Едукација ТЦЕ Гостивар	Едукација за деца од предучилишна и училишна возраст	Контакт телефон: 070 228 644 Адреса: Циглана 1 бр.29 <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pg/Центар-За-Современа-Едукација-ТЦЕ-Гостивар-794781910542481">https://www.facebook.com/pg/Центар-За-Современа-Едукација-ТЦЕ-Гостивар-794781910542481</a>
Гостивар	КК Гостивар 1954	Кошаркарски клуб	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/kkgostivar/">https://www.facebook.com/kkgostivar/</a>
Гостивар	ФК Гостивар	Фудбалски клуб	Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:kfggostivari@gmail.com">kfggostivari@gmail.com</a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/KFG-Gostivari/">https://www.facebook.com/KFG-Gostivari/</a>
Гостивар	Здружение за грижи и воспитување на децата на општина Гостивар		Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:j-angelko@live.com">j-angelko@live.com</a>
Гостивар	Шотокан Карате клуб Полог	Карате клуб	Контакт телефон: 078 288 747 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:andrievski.goce@gmail.com">andrievski.goce@gmail.com</a> ; <a href="mailto:kkpolog@hotmail.com">kkpolog@hotmail.com</a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pg/Shotokan-Karate-Klub-POLOG-Gostivar-292562644943065">https://www.facebook.com/pg/Shotokan-Karate-Klub-POLOG-Gostivar-292562644943065</a>
Гостивар	Асоцијација за интеграција на ромите „Месечина“	НВО	Контакт телефон: 042 222 271 Адреса: Браќа Ѓиноски Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:mesecina@mesecina.org.mk">mesecina@mesecina.org.mk</a> Веб сајт: <a href="http://www.mesecina.org.mk">http://www.mesecina.org.mk</a>
Гостивар	Центар за женски права Етика	НВО	Контакт телефон: 072 622 274 Адреса: Никола Парапунов <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Etika-916672075121226/">https://www.facebook.com/Etika-916672075121226/</a>

Гостивар	Ж.К.К. Гостивар	Женски кошаркарски клуб	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/%D0%96%D0%9A%D0%9A-%D0%93%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%80-139357186171331/">https://www.facebook.com/%D0%96%D0%9A%D0%9A-%D0%93%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%80-139357186171331/</a>
Гостивар	Планинарски спортски клуб Бистра	Спортски клуб	Контакт телефон: 075 433 781 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:bistragostivar@gmail.com">bistragostivar@gmail.com</a> ; <a href="mailto:zzdravkovic2006@yahoo.com">zzdravkovic2006@yahoo.com</a>
Гостивар	НУ Центар за култура АСНОМ	Центар за култура	Контакт телефон: (042) 215-760 Адреса: бул. „Браќа Ѓиноски“, б.б.
Гостивар	Општински сојуз на здруженија за техничка култура – Народна техника Гостивар	Ширење на техничката култура, откривање и развој на талентот на младите во науката и техниката	Контакт: +389 42 520 433 ; +389 70 345 259 Адреса: ЈНА 66 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:narodnatehnika_gostivar@yahoo.com">narodnatehnika_gostivar@yahoo.com</a>
Гостивар	Фудбалски клуб Риниа с. Неготино	Фудбалски клуб	Контакт телефон: 071563163 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:kf.rinia@hotmail.com">kf.rinia@hotmail.com</a>
Гостивар	Организација на жените турци во Македонија Гостивар		Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:matukat@hotmail.com">matukat@hotmail.com</a>
Гостивар	Здружение Младински совет на Гостивар		Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:mladinskisovetnagostivar@yahoo.com">mladinskisovetnagostivar@yahoo.com</a>
Гостивар	Женски центар Гостивар		Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:Velichkoska@t-home-com">Velichkoska@t-home-com</a>
Гостивар	Здружение на ликовни уметници во Македонија – Draudacum		Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:draudacum@gmail.com">draudacum@gmail.com</a>
Гостивар	Фондација за наука, култура и уметност Илксав		Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:ilksavgostivar@hotmail.com">ilksavgostivar@hotmail.com</a>
Гостивар	Асоцијација за демократска иницијатива		Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:adi@adi.org.mk">adi@adi.org.mk</a>
Гостивар	Центар без граници		Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:marigona_xhaferi@hotmail.com">marigona_xhaferi@hotmail.com</a>
Гостивар	Здружение за просвета култура и уметност Намик Ефенди		Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:namikefen-di@hotmail.com">namikefen-di@hotmail.com</a>
Гостивар	Заншин Доцо	Карате и фитнес центар	Контакт телефон: 078 288 747 Адреса: Борче Јовановски <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pg/sho-tokankarateklubpolog">https://www.facebook.com/pg/sho-tokankarateklubpolog</a>

Гостивар	ГАКУД “Браќа Ѓиноски” Гостивар	Културно уметничко друштво за чување на традициите и фолклорот (играорна)	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/pg/brakjaginoski">https://www.facebook.com/pg/brakjaginoski</a>
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## Annex 3: Tetovo model




## Tetovo Roster of Services

Тетово	Менада	градски женски младински хор	Контакт телефон: 044 337558 Вебсајт: <a href="http://www.hormenada.mk">http://www.hormenada.mk</a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/hormenada/">https://www.facebook.com/hormenada/</a>
Тетово	Лале	Градски детски хор	Контакт телефон: 044 337558 ; 078 240797 Адреса: Гоце Делчев 234 Вебсајт: <a href="http://hormenada.mk/detski-hor-lale/">http://hormenada.mk/detski-hor-lale/</a>
Тетово	Сојуз на албанската жена во Македонија		Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:albanskata-zenanamakedonija@gmail.com">albanskata-zenanamakedonija@gmail.com</a>
Тетово	Скијачки клуб Шкендија		Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:shkendijas-ki@gmail.com">shkendijas-ki@gmail.com</a>
Тетово	До Јенг Кун	Кик-бокс клуб	Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:do-jeng-kun@hotmail.com">do-jeng-kun@hotmail.com</a>

Тетово	ФК Шкендија	Спортски клуб	Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:shkendijafc@gmail.com">shkendijafc@gmail.com</a>
Тетово	Оdboјкарски клуб Шкендија	Спортски клуб	Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:pellumbve-la@yahoo.com">pellumbve-la@yahoo.com</a>
Тетово	Општински сојуз на училишен спорт		Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:lidhja_sportive@hotmail.com">lidhja_sportive@hotmail.com</a>
Тетово	Педагози	Здружение	Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:shoqata.pedagog-tetov@hotmail.com">shoqata.pedagog-tetov@hotmail.com</a>
Тетово	Атлетски клуб тетово	Спорт	Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:atletski_klub@yahoo.com">atletski_klub@yahoo.com</a>
Тетово	Женски одбојкарски клуб Шкендија	Спортски клуб	Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:zenskiskendija@live.com">zenskiskendija@live.com</a>
Тетово	Здружение на ликовни уметници		Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:shaft.tetova@gmail.com">shaft.tetova@gmail.com</a>
Тетово	Летечка Театарска Труппа	Театар	Контакт телефон: 070 672 811 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:letecka_teatarska_trupa@yahoo.com">letecka_teatarska_trupa@yahoo.com</a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pg/leteckateatarskatrupaa">https://www.facebook.com/pg/leteckateatarskatrupaa</a>
Тетово	КУД Свети Сава	За српската заедница	Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:kudsvetisavetetovo@gmail.com">kudsvetisavetetovo@gmail.com</a> <a href="https://mk-mk.facebook.com/pg/kudsvetisavatetovo">https://mk-mk.facebook.com/pg/kudsvetisavatetovo</a>
Тетово	Женски форум		Контакт телефон: 044 337 440 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:info@forumi.org.mk">info@forumi.org.mk</a> Вебсајт: <a href="http://www.forumi.org.mk">http://www.forumi.org.mk</a>

## Annex 4: Kumanovo model

### KUMANOVO



### Kumanovo Roster of Services

Куманово	КУД Панче Пешев	Културно уметничко друштво (играорна)	Контакт телефон: 078/ 258-032 Адреса: Кирил и Методиј бб. (гимназиски двор) <a href="https://en-gb.facebook.com/kud-pancepesev.kumanovo/">https://en-gb.facebook.com/kud-pancepesev.kumanovo/</a>
Куманово	Театар Куманово	Театар	Адреса: Кирил и Методиј бб. <a href="https://teatarkumanovo.mk/">https://teatarkumanovo.mk/</a>
Куманово	НУЦК Трајко Прокопиев	Театар	Контакт телефон: 031 423 950 Адреса: Свети Кирил и Методиј, Куманово 1300
Куманово	Општински сојуз на спортови		Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:osskkumanovo@yahoo.com">osskkumanovo@yahoo.com</a>
Куманово	Центар за интеркултурен дијалог	Здружение	Контакт телефон: 031 421 330 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:info@cid.mk">info@cid.mk</a> <a href="http://cid.mk/">http://cid.mk/</a>
Куманово	Младински совет		Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:kumanovoyouthcouncil@gmail.com">kumanovoyouthcouncil@gmail.com</a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/KumanovoYouthCouncil/">https://www.facebook.com/KumanovoYouthCouncil/</a>
Куманово	Agarcy	Аикидо клуб	Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:agatsudojo@yahoo.com">agatsudojo@yahoo.com</a>



## Skopje Roster of Services

Општина	Име на организација	Дејност	Контакт
Скопје	Ансамбл на народни игри и ора – Орце Николов	Играорна	Контакт телефон: 02 311 6117 ; 077-577-595 ; 070 349 349 Адреса: Гоце Делчев 4 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:ornik@t.mk">ornik@t.mk</a>
Скопје	АКУД Мирче Ацев	Играорна	Контакт телефон: 02 306 6808 Адреса: Дрезденска 6.6. п.фах 456 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:akud@ukim.edu.mk">akud@ukim.edu.mk</a>
Скопје	Фолклорно студио Етнос	Играорна / Здружение на граѓани	Контакт телефон: 070 338 261 Адреса: Злате Михајловски 26 Вебсајт: <a href="http://www.studioetnos.org">http://www.studioetnos.org</a>
Скопје	Ансамбл за народни песни и ора – Танец	Играорна / Национална установа	Контакт телефон: 02 246 1021 Адреса: Бенјамин Мучуковски 7 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:tanec@tanec.com.mk">tanec@tanec.com.mk</a> Вебсајт: <a href="http://www.tanec.com.mk">http://www.tanec.com.mk</a>
Скопје	Фолклорни бисери	Играорна	Контакт телефон: 070 222 625 Адреса: булевар АСНОМ 74 <a href="https://mk-mk.facebook.com/pg/folk-lornibiseri/about/?ref=page_internal">https://mk-mk.facebook.com/pg/folk-lornibiseri/about/?ref=page_internal</a>
Скопје	Театарска Младина на Македонија	Национално тело во кое членуваат здруженија, театри итн.	Контакт телефон: 070 205 839 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:nelkomk@gmail.com">nelkomk@gmail.com</a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Teatarska-Mladina-na-Makedonija-2015445328596532/">https://www.facebook.com/Teatarska-Mladina-na-Makedonija-2015445328596532/</a>
Скопје	Буден театар	Театарска група - НВО	Контакт телефон: 077 817 452 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:budenteatar@gmail.com">budenteatar@gmail.com</a> Вебсајт: <a href="http://www.budenteatar.org">http://www.budenteatar.org</a> <a href="https://mk-mk.facebook.com/pg/BudenTeatar">https://mk-mk.facebook.com/pg/BudenTeatar</a>
Скопје	Сенки и облаци	Театарска група	Контакт телефон: 075 426 943 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:shadowsandclouds.theater@gmail.com">shadowsandclouds.theater@gmail.com</a> Вебсајт: <a href="http://www.shadowsandclouds.net">http://www.shadowsandclouds.net</a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pg/senkioblaci">https://www.facebook.com/pg/senkioblaci</a>
Скопје	Македонски народен театар	Театар	Контакт телефон: 02 321 6725 Адреса: 11 Март бр. 3 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:info@mmt.mk">info@mmt.mk</a> Вебсајт: <a href="https://mmt.mk/mk/">https://mmt.mk/mk/</a>
Скопје	Драмски театар	Театар	Контакт телефон: 2 3063 388 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:info@dramskiteatar.com.mk">info@dramskiteatar.com.mk</a> Адреса: ул. Шекспирова 15 Вебсајт: <a href="https://dramskiteatar.com.mk">https://dramskiteatar.com.mk</a>
Скопје	Кошаркарски клуб МВП Скопје	Вршат уписи на деца во школи	Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:kkmvpskopje@yahoo.com">kkmvpskopje@yahoo.com</a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pg/MVPSkopje">https://www.facebook.com/pg/MVPSkopje</a>

Скопје	Кошаркарски клуб Вардар	Кошаркарски клуб	Контакт телефон: 02 323 2999 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:kkvardar@gmail.com">kkvardar@gmail.com</a> Вебсајт: <a href="http://kkvardar.mk">http://kkvardar.mk</a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pg/KosarkarskiKlubVardar">https://www.facebook.com/pg/KosarkarskiKlubVardar</a>
Скопје	КК Работнички	Кошаркарски клуб	Контакт телефон: 070 239 327 Вебсајт: <a href="http://kkrabotnicki.mk">http://kkrabotnicki.mk</a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pg/KK.Rabotnicki.Skopje">https://www.facebook.com/pg/KK.Rabotnicki.Skopje</a>
Скопје	КК МЗТ Скопје	Кошаркарски клуб	Контакт телефон: 02 2444 567 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:contact@mztoskopjeaerodrom.mk">contact@mztoskopjeaerodrom.mk</a> Адреса: Бул.Јане Сандански бр.1 Вебсајт: <a href="https://www.mztoskopjeaerodrom.mk">https://www.mztoskopjeaerodrom.mk</a>
Скопје	ФК Македонија Ѓ.П 1932 АД	Фудбалски клуб	Контакт телефон: 02 2050 106 ; 075258030 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:fk_makedonija@yahoo.com.mk">fk_makedonija@yahoo.com.mk</a> Адреса: ул. Горче Петров бр.33 ; ул.Мице Козар б.б.
Скопје	ФК Вардар АД	Фудбалски клуб	Контакт телефон: 02 3130 712 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:fc_vardar.skopje@yahoo.com">fc_vardar.skopje@yahoo.com</a> Адреса: бул. Илинден бр.82 Вебсајт: <a href="http://www.fkvardar.mk">www.fkvardar.mk</a>
Скопје	ФК Работнички АД	Фудбалски клуб	Контакт телефон: 070 629 814 ; 078 341 825 Електронска пошта: <a href="mailto:fcrabotnicki@yahoo.com">fcrabotnicki@yahoo.com</a> ; <a href="mailto:contact@rabotnicki.com">contact@rabotnicki.com</a> Адреса: ул Македонија бр.10/1-1 Вебсајт: <a href="http://www.rabotnicki.com">www.rabotnicki.com</a>





