

PERCEPTIONS OF FRONT-LINE SCHOOL WORKERS AND COMMUNITY OFFICIALS FROM SKOPJE, KUMANOVO, TETOVO AND GOSTIVAR ON RADICALIZATION LEADING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM

BASELINE STUDY

SKOPJE, JANUARY 2019

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This baseline study was developed within the Project: **“Educate to Prevent - Strengthening Front-line School Workers and Parents to Build Youth Resilience to Violent Extremism”** implemented by Centre for Research and Policy Making – CRPM and Centre for Education Development – CED in association with NEXUS civil concept. The publication is prepared with the support of the Hedayah Centre of Excellence in Countering violent extremism as part of the *STRIVE Global Program, through the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) of the European Union*.

The opinions and viewpoints expressed in this baseline study reflect the opinions and viewpoints of authors of this publication and do not represent the opinions of the European Union or other supporting organizations



Project
funded by the
EUROPEAN UNION

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INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

This baseline study is being conducted within the framework of the project “Educate to Prevent –Strengthening Front-line School Workers and Parents to Build Youth Resilience to Violent Extremism,” which aims to develop community resilience to radicalization and violent extremism through the empowerment of front-line school workers and students’ parents. The Baseline study presents the findings of the field research using mixed method approach: a representative survey of front-line school workers; and interviews with community officials (municipal and police representatives as well as officials from the two dominant religious communities in North Macedonia: the Orthodox Christian and the Islamic community). The research has been conducted in the course of May – June 2018. The statistical data after performed quality control were analyzed using SPSS.

This study presents data on the current level of knowledge and skills of frontline workers on recognizing radicalization leading to violent extremism. The purpose of the study is to enable specific targeting of the follow-up capacity building activities of the Educate to prevent project and setting up indicators for measuring progress within this target group on radicalization leading to violent extremism. The study specifically determines level of awareness (including knowledge, values, and attitudes) concerning

the threat of radicalization and violent extremism among school and municipal staff; identifies mechanisms developed on a school and/or municipal level for prevention, recognizing and reacting to potential cases of radicalization (detecting potential good practices); analysis policies required for appropriate tackling of the problem (including development of skills of school and municipal staff, development of curricular and extra-curricular materials, referral mechanisms, etc.); it establishes methods through which data and other information about CVE is collected; and expands on the thoughts of the respondents regarding what resources are needed, what courses of action should be followed, and what topics should be made areas of focus in CVE efforts..

Overall this baseline study provides an information base against which to monitor and assess the project’s progress and effectiveness during implementation and after the project is completed. In addition, the baseline study informs one of the main activity packages of the project - Capacity building of frontline school workers, parents and municipal officials on P/CVE and detection of early signs of radicalization (Work package 2). The findings of the study also informs the development of the training and mentoring program and the establishment of a municipal preventive system for radicalization leading to violent extremism (Work package 3)

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

The baseline study utilizes secondary data collected from research papers, articles, and official documents, as well as empirical data gleaned from the survey, which serves as its main source of data. In order to gather the empirical data, qualitative and quantitative methodologies such as interviews and a survey have been used. This survey was conducted in 22 high schools in Skopje and in the municipalities of Kumanovo, Tetovo, and Gostivar, which are the target areas of the project. The schools are multi-ethnic and deliver education in both Macedonian and Albanian language of instruction. 505 frontline school workers responded to the survey. A “frontline school worker” can be defined as a worker that interacts directly with students within a school and can include teachers, administrative staff, principals, psychologists, pedagogues and the like that are employed by schools. By applying randomized survey method and in accordance with the analysis of the demographic data, 52% of these respondents were ethnic Albanians, 43% were ethnic Macedonians, and 5% were of other ethnicities. The survey encompassed all psychologists, pedagogues in each school and other 20 teachers from each school. The selection of respondents was random. The data collection was organized in each school in the course of one day. The method was expected to reduce the potential of respondents providing socially desirable responses, bearing in mind the sensitivity of the topic.

The questionnaire had 35 research questions that can be divided in four groups of questions: (i) detecting perceptions on violence, extremism, radicalization, methods, environments for indoctrination and etc.; (ii) detecting perceptions on the factors that influence vulnerability of students to radicalization; (iii) detection of activities being conducted in the school, and use of teaching methods and teaching program for tackling indoctrination and

radicalization among students; (iv) detecting current capacities and future training needs for tackling radicalization in schools.

Further, 40 semi-structured interviews were held with frontline school workers, municipality representatives, police officials working with Local Councils for Prevention (LCPs), and religious workers in each of the targeted municipalities. The aim of the interviews was to gather in-depth information on the practices of tackling violence and roots to adoption of radical ideologies among youth; current policies and institutional frameworks for responding to violent extremism and needs for upgrading the existing practices to establish an effective response to the radicalization trends.

A research of this kind inevitably faces a number of limitations that need to be taken into consideration when drawing relevant conclusions and drafting recommendations. Apart from the time limit to implement field research activities of this scope within 2 months, the delicate subject matter, and the sensitivity of the topic, there are issues that arise from the methodological choices applied to the research, but also from the availability of primary data.

Firstly, the survey was conducted in the schools in the morning. Considering that some schools work in shifts some selection bias exists in the end results, although we ensured that teachers from both language of instruction: Macedonian and Albanian are included to minimize the effect of gathering the perceptions of one community only.

Another limitation was the lack of enforcement mechanisms to ensure that all questions are answered fully and consistently. This largely depends on the willingness of the respondent and enforcement is not recommendable in the course of the research. Since the questionnaire was extensive (please see it in Annex 1) there were cases when respondents did not answer fully all the questions in

the survey. To minimize the impact of this occurrence during the analysis of our results we paid more attention to the percentage shares than the absolute numbers under each answer option.

Finally, we faced challenge of accessing secondary resources and statistical data on the topic as no other primary research has been conducted before on this topic. All available sources to date have been consulted and used appropriately.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An issue that has recently been gaining significance in the Western Balkans is the issue of violent extremism. Ethnic tensions that had been building for decades and the wars of the 1990s and early 2000s have left bound up wounds in the consciousness of the region that have the potential to open up again. One of the ways in which those tensions have been expressing themselves in recent years is in the advent of violent extremism. In North Macedonia, the post-civil war context, as well as the recent political dominance of a party that contributed to the ethnic divisions in the country, must be taken into consideration when thinking about how to approach this phenomenon. The approaches inside North Macedonia have included efforts by the national and municipal governments and police forces, civil society organizations, schools, and religious institutions. This broad and multi-actor approach has been agreed to be the most effective manner of countering violent extremism at the true grassroots level, as opposed to merely relying on the police force in a securitized approach. Countering violent extremism by engaging frontline school workers (teachers, principals, and administrative officials) is a particularly useful method of countering violent extremism among youth, in that education or lack thereof is a

critical component of whether someone will develop extremist views in their lifetime.

The following study presents the baseline view of frontline school workers in three Macedonian municipalities where violent extremism has seen some increases in recent years. It further has the goal of identifying gaps in knowledge on the part of frontline school workers that can be addressed by the future training program conducted by Hedayah and CRPM. The baseline determines the levels of familiarity with the subject matter, capacities to respond to radicalization and training needs for the future of the target group. In general, **the purpose of a baseline study is to provide an information base against which to monitor and assess a project's progress and effectiveness during implementation and after the project is completed.** This particular baseline acts as a starting point for activities that will be conducted within the framework of the current project. In schools so that activities will not be repeated, nor will steps be skipped without laying appropriate groundwork for activities. Further, the baseline acts as a quantitative and qualitative measuring stick against which data can be measured. This will aid in determining the effectiveness of current actions which can then potentially be applied in other contexts in order to combat violent extremism more generally.

The baseline study is made up of several components. They include: (1) the respondents' basic perceptions of violent extremism and its terminology, (2) their perceptions of the reasons for violent incidents in schools, (3) how the school and other institutions respond to instances of violent extremism, (4) how data and other information about CVE is collected, and (5) their thoughts on what resources are needed or what courses of action should be taken, as well as what topics should be focused on by CVE efforts. In general, regarding basic perceptions (1), it seems that the frontline school workers do not have clarity about the difference

between the main terms in the CVE orbit or about what violent extremism actually is. They also lacked familiarity with most of the national strategies on the topic. Further, interestingly, there were often stark differences in the way ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians perceived the same events, with more Macedonians perceiving there to have been significantly more violent events in the past year than ethnic Albanians. Regarding reasons for violent incidents in schools (2), an interesting finding to note was that the majority of respondents believed that violent incidents in schools were caused by a different factor than religious, ethnic, or religious and ethnic factors. Interestingly, this “other” category for explanation of violent incidents held an especially high percentage for respondents in Skopje. A final interesting finding to note regarding violent incidents was the stark difference between the perceptions of frontline school workers and the municipal representatives in any given municipality. The school workers were much more likely than the municipal representatives to insist that there were violent incidents in schools and in increasing numbers, and municipal representatives emphasized that those numbers were decreasing or that incidents didn’t exist. This may suggest miscommunication between the municipality and the schools within it or a different perspective regarding the different roles that actors ought to play. Regarding responses to instances of violent extremism (3), many municipalities follow what could be called a collaboration method of response, with multiple actors involved at different stages (teachers, parents, municipalities, police). Further, some municipalities have taken preemptive actions during times of ethnic sensitivity (pre-election periods, for instance). A very significant finding to note here was that a vast majority of respondents (77%) were either opposed to or did not know whether the religious community should become involved if there was a religiously-motivated violent incident happening in a school, which contradicts the philosophy of many CVE initiatives, which typically want to involve religious leaders.

When it comes to how data about CVE is collected (4), it was emphasized that the teachers should be the first line of data collection about students, while also making sure not to turn the school into an extended arm of the police performing screening or investigation for potential incidents or extremists. On the ways how data on CVE is collected, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) mentioned several information sources, including, critically, social media; whereas, the municipal representatives and religious leaders were vague and self-contradictory when identifying sources they used for data collection on CVE, which can not only affect the reliability and validity of data (as well as its existence at all) but could also pose threats to efforts, being that CVE is a sensitive topic and information about it must be carefully considered as well as worded.

Finally, regarding what resources they need, the topics that should be covered, and who should be involved, the teachers identified as useful topics to add to the school curriculum the basics of violent extremism and religious and ethnic tolerances. Regarding their own training, a large majority of teachers had not attended a training on the topic of VE or ethnic/religious tolerance in the past five years (78%). It is not surprising then that when it came to resources or activities needed, the teachers wanted more trainings and/or more staff trained in matters of CVE. They further emphasized the need for a systematic and standardized approach to CVE in schools rather than the ad-hoc one that is currently in place (one of the key takeaways from this report). Regarding the main institution responsible for CVE matters, the teachers identified the schools combined with families, as well as various media sources (traditional and social). While the MOI insisted on an integrated approach of all actors, the municipal representatives were vague and imprecise on this question (with the exception of Kisela Voda, see report) and religious leaders suggested a collaboration between schools and national/municipal governments.

It is clear that a capacity building program for frontline school workers and municipal officials is necessary when it comes to different institutional responses to violent extremism in North Macedonia. The frontline school workers require trainings in CVE basics and ethnic/religious tolerance, which will be provided in a specific location by the project “Educate to Prevent” while the religious institutions and

municipalities may benefit from trainings in data collection on CVE. A CVE project that wants to include religious institutions in its work may want to reconsider that idea on the basis of the perception of these stakeholders. Finally, a more systematized and standardized approach in schools, wherein there is a protocol of how to respond to VE incidents among students, is critical.

RADICALIZATION LEADING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

SITUATION RELATED TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM (VE) IN REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

The last census taken in Macedonia, which occurred in 2002, recorded the population as being 2,022,547. 64% of this population are ethnically Macedonian, The next largest ethnic group are ethnic Albanians, who make up 25.17% of the total population. The third largest ethnic group are ethnic Turks, with 3.85%. There are several other ethnic groups following these with negligible percentages of the population. Out of the whole population, 33.3% are Muslims, where religious belief is almost exclusively divided along ethnic lines, with the vast majority of ethnic Macedonians being Eastern Orthodox and the vast majority of ethnic Albanians being Muslim (State Statistical Office, 2002). While in general there is peaceful coexistence among the various ethnic and religious groups in North Macedonia, there are certain tensions that exist, and although North Macedonia largely escaped unscathed from the conflicts

resulting from the breakup of Former Yugoslavia, tensions in the country once culminated in an armed conflict in 2001. This short-lived conflict was between the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) and the Macedonian armed forces. In this conflict, as many as 100 NLA fighters were killed, whilst on the side of Macedonian armed forces that number is 75 (Bender 2013, 341). re

The 2001 armed conflict resulted in the deaths of about 205 people- far less than the nearly 140,000 people who died in the wars of the 1990s in Bosnia and Croatia (International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2009, 1). The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) put an end to the nearly 10-month conflict and put in place rights for the ethnic Albanian minority in North Macedonia and established power-sharing rules between Albanian and Macedonian political parties. While the agreement did set in place legal correctors for the

losses and discrimination felt by the ethnic Albanians, to this day nationalism and ethnic superiority narratives are propagated and exploited by both ethnic groups (Popovska and Ristoska 2015, 63).

The grievance narratives on both sides that culminated in the 2001 conflict had been building for decades and centred on the perceived and actual exclusion of ethnic Albanians in Macedonian society. This exclusion was seen in the political, economic and social spheres. On the ethnic Macedonian side, the grievance narrative focused on fears of the loss of majority status and of “Macedonian land.” Though the grievance narratives cannot single-handedly explain violent extremism as it exists in North Macedonia, both they and the 2001 armed conflict are essential to understand the context of extremist viewpoints on the part of both ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians in the Republic of North Macedonia, and are necessary for the reader’s understanding of the social situation.

Though arguably better since 2001, relations between the two ethnicities in the country remain fragile. Since the signing of the OFA, and particularly in the 2010s, the country has experienced several smaller bouts of ethnic conflicts. These have included ethnically-motivated attacks, violent protests, beatings, and attacks on police. It is critical to note that these types of incidents usually increased during pre-election periods, which was likely thanks to political parties on both sides igniting ethnic tensions as a part of garnering political support.

Tensions between the two ethnic groups often manifest themselves in opposite and mutually-reinforcing ways. In general, Albanians experience actual and perceived discrimination by ethnic Macedonians. Ethnic Macedonians, through the empowerment of ethnic Albanians, experienced a perceived loss of significance and status as the majority. These areas of sensitivity and the subsequent narratives may make violent extremist narratives more attractive to both sides.

It is also critical to note that there is a more recent political conflict that engulfed North Macedonia, and is crucial to understanding the violent extremism landscape in the country. A political crisis took hold in 2015 in the country when the former government under the leadership of Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski was embroiled in a mass wiretapping scandal implicating his party, VMRO-DPMNE (Bechey, 2017). Several months following the scandal, ethnic tensions were reignited when in May 2015 there was a deadly conflict between an armed group of ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian police in Kumanovo, a city just north of Skopje. Following the failure of intelligence to prevent this conflict the Director of the Intelligence Service Saso Mijalkov and the Minister of Interior Gordana Jankulovska resigned. The Przhino Agreement was signed in July of 2015 to end the conflict¹, with elections for a new government being held in December 2016 (European Commission 2015).

During the entire political crisis, which lasted until the formation of a new government by opposition party SDSM in June 2017, ethnic tensions were exploited through the use of propaganda, fearmongering, and narrative building. Following the election of an Albanian speaker of parliament that led to the storming of the Parliament building by mainly Macedonian nationalists and the injuring of 77 parliamentarians in an event that has since come to be known by some as an example of right-wing violent extremism in North Macedonia. Additionally, in the pre-election period there have been cases of interethnic clashes on public transportation,

¹ The Przhino Agreement (2015) ended the political crisis in North Macedonia that began with the revelation of wiretappings of a large portion of the Macedonian population by the government of VMRO-DPMNE. It called for the resignation of VMRO-DPMNE Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, the establishment of a Special Prosecution for the wiretapping scandal, and a caretaker government to lead the country to elections in 2016, which would see the establishment of the administration of the opposition party SDSM in June 2017.

and sporting events². This context is essential to understanding the current climate that might be conducive to violent extremism.

VE IN MACEDONIAN CONTEXT

As of 2018, there were 150 Macedonian citizens who had fled the country to join paramilitary formations in Iraq and Syria (Stojkovski and Kalajdziovski, 2018). This number represents the highest per capita number of foreign fighters from the Muslim population of any Western Balkan country. North Macedonia also has the second-highest number of returned foreign fighters (80) within its borders, where only Kosovo has more (130) (Azinovic, 2018, 9). These significant numbers raise questions about the level of non-violent extremism among the Muslim population in North Macedonia (Stojkovski and Kalajdziovski, 2018, 12), in that, while relatively few terrorist attacks have occurred within the country, it is possible that persons are still becoming radicalized within Macedonian borders without necessarily carrying out violent attacks. This “unseen” radicalization can have negative impacts on the domestic population, particularly in the future.

However, the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of North Macedonia has stated that there has not been a recorded instance of a foreign fighter departure from North Macedonia since 2017. Furthermore, as of 2017, flows of foreign fighters out of North Macedonia have desisted. The main reasons for these stoppages have been the difficulty of reaching Iraq and Syria thanks to the adoption of new legislation aimed at preventing terrorism, as well as ISIL’s loss of virtually all territory it had at one point possessed in

Syria and Iraq (Stojkovski and Kalajdziovski, 2018). However, despite these occurrences, it does not necessarily follow that support for extremist ideas has likewise dissipated; it rather could mean that since extremists that are violently inclined, left without a foreign outlet, could pose serious threats to North Macedonia’s internal security. This possibility raises policy questions for North Macedonia regarding domestic attacks. Further, with high numbers of foreign fighters who have returned from fighting in Iraq and Syria to North Macedonia, it is essential that P/CVE efforts also focus on returnees. However, the lack of reintegration and rehabilitation programs in North Macedonia for returnees complicates the issue and does not bode well for the future (Stojkovski and Kalajdziovski, 2018).

CVE WORK IN NORTH MACEDONIA

In February 2018, the Republic of North Macedonia adopted its first P/CVE strategy as a part of a wider policy of countering terrorism. This strategy, part of a larger four-year strategy (2018-2022), was initiated by the administration of Zoran Zaev and has the goal of aligning North Macedonia’s P/CVE and counter-terrorism efforts with the strategies and methods of the European Union and United Nations. This effort came several years later than the adoption of similar strategies by the other Western Balkans governments and, in addition to being insufficiently comprehensive, focuses more on the security and law enforcement aspects of CVE and largely ignores societal and educational factors and methods of prevention.

In terms of government personnel responsible for P/CVE, there was no coordinating body in existence prior to 2017. There was a counter-terrorism (CT) coordinator, who also worked on CVE, for a brief period. Two coordinators were appointed in 2017 to focus

² Jonuzi, Afrim. „, Ситуацијата во земјата предизвикува национализам (The situation in the country leads to nationalism)”.21 TV. 27.02.2017. <https://bit.ly/2rkV0u4>

on P/CVE and CT, which was a positive marker of the shift in the Macedonian government from a law enforcement perspective of the issue to a more holistic one. However, these coordinators lack the materials and space to carry out their work duties, while also being supported by the international institutions in North Macedonia, including OSCE and the Embassies of the United States and United Kingdom.

Few civil society efforts regarding P/CVE have been completed, but those that have include the international Mother Schools Project being carried out by Women Without Borders in Chair and a municipal project carried out by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Skopje. There have also been research projects on the topic carried out by Analytica Think Tank, IOM, and the British Council.

PERCEPTIONS OF FRONT-LINE SCHOOL WORKERS ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND RADICALIZATION

KNOWLEDGE AND AWARENESS OF MEANING OF RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

On the basis of the survey undertaken for this report, the general impression is that high school teachers are not fully aware of the meaning of radicalization and violent extremism, as they can rarely differentiate between concepts like “extremism”, “radicalism”, “violent extremism”, “terrorism” and “radicalization. It was common for people to provide answers utilizing a combination of those terms to mean the same thing. Thus, it is important to equip frontline school workers with basic theoretical knowledge, in order to be able to better comprehend the matter. This can be done by providing them with real examples (e.g. video, case studies, etc...) of what these concepts actually mean so that the words are not abused and misconceptions spread.

It is further essential to note public perceptions about the extent of the threat posed by violent extremism and religious radicalism in North Macedonia. Only about 16 of respondents identified either of these as the top threat to security in North Macedonia,

with corruption, political instability, and ethnic tensions making up the top three threats. On the other hand, when asked about the greatest threats to security worldwide, the top three threats for the respondents were terrorism, the global migrant crisis, and organized crime. While violent extremism and religious radicalism were not in the top three, they were both identified by around 44% of respondents. This difference between North Macedonia and perceptions for the world as a whole is interesting to note. Further, the fact that many consider ethnic tensions to be a threat within North Macedonia should be applied within the project.

The survey further showed that perception of students becoming radicalized on a religious basis was much higher among respondents in Skopje than in other places. While perceptions do not signify fact, this important finding demonstrates that Skopje should be an area of focus when it comes to working with perceptions of causes of and education about radicalization.


Regarding the profile of persons who would be more susceptible to becoming radicalized, the general perception among frontline schoolworkers was that adolescents coming from poorer families and lower social status in general are more susceptible to accepting radical ideologies, but also prone to different kinds of violence inside and outside school. Dysfunctional, larger and less educated families are also seen as environments where this behavior can be developed. While this represented an occasion where the perception of phenomena was the same among frontline workers regardless of location or ethnicity, there were also stark differences when it

came to the perception of other issues. Regarding violent incidents in the schools where they worked, there were differences in the perceptions of ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. Among ethnic Macedonians, 22.75% of the respondents believe that there had been violent incidents during the last year and a half.

Conversely, 54.98% think that there were no violent incidents within this time span, while 21.8% cannot remember. From the point of view of the ethnic Albanians, 14.86% believe there had been violent incidents within this period, and 63.86% claim that there had not been any incidents. 21.29% cannot remember.

Figure 1: Perception for radicalization of students on religious basis on the territory of the City of Skopje


Do you think that in your school there is a process of radicalization of students on religious basis?



Source: CRPM survey on front-line education workers on violent extremism and radicalization, 2018

Figure 2: Perception for violent incidents in the schools during 2017 and 2018 in North Macedonia among ethnic Macedonians

During 2017 and 2018, had there been violent incidents in the school?




Source: CRPM survey on front-line education workers on violent extremism and radicalization, 2018

The stark differences between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians are noteworthy for consideration regarding how different ethnicities might perceive different events, and this should be taken into account when considering training activities. The figures on municipal level follow those from the national level, Skopje once again being an exception. 31.94% of the surveyed front line school workers from Skopje believe that during 2017 and 2018 there had been violent incidents in their school as opposed to 19% of the surveyed school workers on a national level. To the contrary, 45.83% claim that there had not been violent incidents in the schools where they work during this period. 21.53% do not remember.


It may be significant that many more respondents in Skopje than in the country as whole perceived that there was a violent event in their school in the previous year. This further drives home the idea that Skopje should be an area of special focus for training activities, both with regard to perceptions of violence in schools and violence itself, being that perception of violence there is so much higher than perceptions of violence in the country as a whole. It may also relate to more potent ethnic divides that exist in Skopje and especially with regard to neighborhoods and schools characterized by ethnic tensions.

Figure 3: Perception for violent incidents in the schools during 2017 and 2018 in North Macedonia among ethnic Albanians



Source: CRPM survey on front-line education workers on violent extremism and radicalization, 2018

Figure 4: Perception for violent incidents in the schools during 2017 and 2018 in Skopje



Source: CRPM survey on front-line education workers on violent extremism and radicalization, 2018


PERCEPTIONS OF REASONS FOR VIOLENT INCIDENTS IN SCHOOLS

An important consideration to make with regard to violent incidents in schools was also the respondents' perceptions about why they had occurred. Among the respondents in Skopje that previously reported violent incidents in their school, 8% believe that the violence was religiously motivated, 18% that it was ethnically motivated, while 9% that it was both religiously and ethnically motivated.

Nearly two thirds of the respondents (65%) believe that the origin of the violence should be traced to another issue, which leaves a large question mark regarding the origin of violence in Skopje high schools. It does seem, however, that the question about whether the violent incidents in Skopje high schools was answered quite firmly to be perceived to be more of an ethnic issue than a religious issue. It would be useful in further research or focus groups to ask what they do believe was the causal factor in the violent incidents, or to expand possible answers to the questions.


From the point of view of the teachers at the high schools, a variety of reasons were presented for the violent incidents. Only one teacher commented on sporadic incidents in her school, but

Figure 5: Origin of violence in the schools in North Macedonia



Source: CRPM survey on front-line education workers on violent extremism and radicalization, 2018

Figure 6: Origin of violence in the schools in Skopje



Source: CRPM survey on front-line education workers on violent extremism and radicalization, 2018

similar to some of her peers in Skopje, she connected them primarily to puberty (Int. 1, KU). While teachers from Tetovo comment that ethnic and religious incidents are either non-existent or completely fading away, but several of them link the lack of incidents to segregation of the students in different school buildings, or in separate school shifts (Int. 1, TE and Int. 3, TE). One of the teachers commented that sometimes minor incidents happen, mainly due to political tensions created by the political parties (Int. 6, TE). This plethora of answers demonstrates the complexity of violent incidents at schools and the numerous factors which can all potentially be causing or mutually reinforcing one another, as well as the questions surrounding whether the incidents are increasing or decreasing, whether they are an ethnic/religious issue or not, and whether different policies focused on decreasing the number of incidents are having the desired effect, or are merely making matters worse. The project should keep in mind political messaging and questions of puberty when it comes to violent incidents in schools. This is because occurrences during the time of puberty happen concurrently with the other complex processes surrounding the development of radical mindsets among youth, and may play a significant role in the radicalization of those youth. The particular intersection of ethnicity and politics in North Macedonia, and in particular during the political crises of the past several years, should further be considered when it comes to the radicalization of the youth due to different political messages.

Further, regarding the causes of the violent incidents in schools, the municipal representative in Kumanovo confirmed what the teachers from the high schools had reported, but he sees the ethnic segregation of the schools as a solution, and not as a problem (Int. 6, KU). His counterpart in Tetovo also commented that no ethnic and religious violence has been reported in recent years (Int. 8, TE). Surprisingly, similar comments were given by the municipal administration interviewee in Gostivar (Int. 6, GV),

which largely differed from those of the high school teachers. On the other hand, according to the same municipal representative from Kumanovo, no cases of religious violence were reported (Int. 13, SK). The other two police representatives did not report on any religious or ethnic violence (Int 1 TE and GV), with the interviewee from Kumanovo noting that even regarding smaller ethnic incidents there is a sharp decline throughout the years (Int. 7, KU). It is significant that the answers of municipal leaders differ from those of the teachers and would be an important consideration for when policies surrounding violence prevention in schools and policies to address this are announced, given the differing experiences of municipal representatives and the teachers themselves. It also points to the complexity of the occurrence of violence in schools, given that teachers and municipal officials appear to be looking at different data or appear to have vastly different experience and perspective according to the role that they ought to play regarding CVE. . It is further critical that from a police point of view incidents are on the decrease, but according to most of the teachers, they are not. This suggests that there may be some flaws in information sharing between schools and the local police force.


To this end the CRPM Survey of front-line education workers on violent extremism and radicalization seconds the finding of the complexity of not just occurrence but also suitable environments for indoctrination and radicalization of youth. Namely, on national level, front line school workers named the internet and social media as the most suitable place for indoctrination and radicalization (70.89%), followed by religious institutions and religious schools (46.73%) and peer groups (31.09%) (Fig. 3) In regards to the ethnic structure of the respondents there is not a great difference. The ethnic Albanians' choices are following those on national level, while the Macedonians opted for the same top two choices, putting party youth organizations as a third relevant environment for indoctrination and radicalization (33.64%) instead of peer groups.

Regarding the municipalities, once again, internet and social media are considered the most suitable environment for indoctrination and radicalization.

A final important finding regarding general perceptions of violent extremism among the respondents was their lack of familiarity about national strategies on the subject. The four categories of interviewees were asked about *how familiar they are with the existence of the CT and CVE national strategies and action plans*. Only the frontline school workers who had attended OSCE's basic training on P/CVE were familiar with the existence of these documents and the National Committee for CVE and CT (Int. 1, SK; Int. 7, SK;

Int. 4, TE; Int. 5, TE; Int. 6, TE; Int. 1, GV; Int. 2, GV and Int. 4, GV). None of the other interviewees had never heard neither about the national strategies and action plans, nor about the National Committee. Therefore, it is important to mention the national strategy and national action plan in the training organized within the "Educate to Prevent" project. Any further project would do well to raise awareness among stakeholders such as about the existence of these strategies, their contents, and their own role within these strategies and what initiatives are happening that may affect them, and how they may participate. It would also be critical to involve these strategies, as well as the National Committee, in future trainings on the topic in North Macedonia.

Figure 7: Most suitable environments for indoctrination and radicalization in North Macedonia



Source: CRPM survey on front-line education workers on violent extremism and radicalization, 2018

PERCEPTIONS OF FRONT-LINE SCHOOL WORKERS ON CAUSES FOR RADICALIZATION

Violent, masculine culture; social exclusion and limited availability of other non-violent ideologies are the main meso reasons why young people choose to accept propagation of radical ideology and use of violence. The masculine and violent culture of society is contributing to violent behavior. Namely, the reason why young people would accept *radical ideologies, which propagate use of violence* is because *“they believe that through use of violence they will be more valued and respected from the environment”* (72.62% believe this reason to be very significant or partially significant). To this end, peer-pressure is also creating a conducive environment for adoption of violence as a behavior option. There is no ethnic or difference in terms of municipality where the respondents come from. What is worrying is that again majority of respondents find that there is *“no better alternative (with regards to ideology) in the environment they live in”* (70.37% find this reason very significant or partially significant) and therefore youth accept propagation of radical ideology and use of violence³.

On individual, micro-level, identity problems, failed integration, feelings of alienation, marginalization, and discrimination seem to be the main reasons why young people tend to accept propagation of radical ideologies and use of violence. The CRPM survey showed that frontline workers believe that *accepting radical ideologies which propagate use of violence* in Macedonian high schools are due to the fact that these young people *“are violent by nature and request*

for ways to justify their aggression” (combined answers of 72.2% of the respondents think this is significant or partially at least significant). A rather big number of front-line workers in education also believe that young people *“feel discriminated (e.g. on ethnic, religious, political and social basis)”* (68.65% find it very significant or partially significant, while 22.82% believe that this reason is insignificant) and therefore accept radical ideologies. There is no significant differences in regards to municipalities and ethnicity in this regard. The discontent with the system and the need to be rebellious and change it is the third reason why respondents think that young people accept radical ideologies that use violence. Namely 73.02% of the respondents find that the statement *“They feel that they are victims of the injustice of the system and rebel because of that”* as very significant or partially significant. This is mainly because they are not integrated and / or *“have difficulties to fit in the environment, and look for groups which will accept them”* (according to 71.97% of the surveyed believe that this reason is very significant or partially significant). The integration is only better off in Gostivar, where the ratio between those who find the statement significant and partially significant is 59.61% vis-à-vis those who find it insignificant (31.73%)⁴. It seems that acceptance of radical ideologies is less because youngsters *“seek adventure and excitement”* (43.93% of front-line workers find this reason very significant or partially significant, while 37.38% believe that this reason is insignificant). While in Skopje and in Gostivar the figures follow the national trend, in Kumanovo and Tetovo, the ratio between these two figures is 56% vis-à-vis 25% and 34.67% vis-à-vis 49.33% respectively. This means that in Kumanovo the radical ideologies seem more appealing than in the rest of the country whereas in

³ Except in the City of Skopje, where probably there are more options available so the ratio between those that find this statement significant and partially significant is 61.75% vis-à-vis 28.19% who find it insignificant.

⁴ This is again confirmed with the results of the statement *“They try to defend themselves from the ‘domination’ of the majority in the community, by making themselves different than others!”* where the ratio in Gostivar notes 10% difference from the rest of the country where the research was conducted.

Tetovo less appealing. Furthermore, CRPM research observes also a difference regarding the ethnic structure of the respondents. Namely, for 47.64% of the ethnic Macedonians treat this reason as very significant or partially significant, 39.15% see it as insignificant, while within the Albanian camp, 38.58% see this reason as very significant or partially significant, 37.01% as insignificant. Similarly, around half of the respondents believe that the youth “*are curious regarding different ideologies*” (49.21% believe this reason to be very significant or partially significant, conversely to 35.06% who find this reason insignificant) and therefore more opened to accepting radical ideologies and use of violence. Another reason is that “*they are in search of their identity/sense of belonging*” (59.2% find this reason very significant or partially significant). The alienation and the quest for own identity is mostly significant in the municipality of Kumanovo, where the ratio between these two figures is 78.21% vis-à-vis 14.85%, while the results are similar for both Macedonian and Albanian respondents. The “*search for answers/more understanding about religion and find them in extremist groups*” is also backed as a reason for acceptance of radical ideology and use of violence

by more than the half of the CRPM surveyed front-line workers in education (57.08% find it very significant or partially significant, while 26.95% believe that this reason is insignificant). There are no significant differences between municipalities and ethnicity.

On a macro level there seems to be quite an agreement that youth consider radical ideologies and use of violence as “*an appropriate reaction to certain global injustices (unresolved conflicts, wars, repressions on certain ethnic, religious, political groups)*” (63.42% of front-line workers in education find this reason either very significant or partially significant, while 21.87 find this reason insignificant). The majority of the municipalities follow the trend, but in the municipality of Kumanovo, the ratio between these two figures is 76.24% vis-à-vis 10.89%. This can be explained with the fact that this municipality has been most hit from the Kosovo refugee crises, the inter-ethnic conflict from 2001 and is still giving most number of mercenaries working in conflict regions such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. On the other hand, there is no difference in trends on national and municipal level for both Macedonian and Albanian respondents.

CURRENT METHODS FOR MANAGING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The third critical component of the baseline study is the current work or strategies, informal or formal, that have been and are being carried out related to violent extremism thus far. At the national level, according to the frontline workers that made up the respondents to the survey, the top three stakeholders responsible for intervention in cases of indoctrination or radicalization among the students are the parents (339 respondents), the teachers (203), and the school support staff (148). A municipal representative from Skopje had the following to say regarding the usual response when there is a violent incident at a high school.

“We have municipal services that deal with these issues. For example, during the physical incidents in the city buses, especially in number 65 that heads towards Stajkovci, and the stoning and fighting in the Singjelic settlement. We assembled different groups of parents in the local office. These misunderstandings are usually resolved through conversation. The police are inserted as a mediator in these situations.” (Int. 11, SK).

In a similar vein, municipalities other than Skopje follow the collaboration method of problem resolution. The Municipality of Gostivar insists on all cases to be solved within the schools firstly. If the school fails to solve them, the municipal administration facilitates the introduction of the police and the parents in order to solve the burning issues (Int. 6, GV).

Further, actions have been and are being taken related to the time periods when ethnic relations have been shown to be particularly fragile, before a violent incident even occurs. In the municipalities of Kumanovo and Tetovo, preventive activities are usually undertaken prior to larger collective sports events, as well as before the commencement of electoral campaigns. The former regularly cooperates with the Mol (Int. 7, KU), while the latter assembles forums consisted of supporters’ groups and political youth organizations (Int. 8, TE). This can be seen as a positive sign that authorities in Kumanovo and Tetovo are taking the problem of exploitation of ethnic tensions seriously and are watchful regarding their ebbs

and flows over time. These kinds of strategies would certainly have a place in any municipal strategy working to combat violent extremism in North Macedonia in particular.

Preventive measures are not limited to the police and local governmental bodies, however. Religious leaders have also developed methods of prevention of violent extremism within religious circles and activities. According to a religious leader from Skopje,

“The Skopje Muftiate takes preventive measures before something such as this can happen. We trained the imams in all the mosques, and in the near future we plan another training that will focus on ways of teaching and communication skills, in particular with the young believers. If any cases of violence, radicalization, or extremism occur, we are in close coordination with the imam and the parents.” (Int. 14, SK). It is noticeable that prevention and management of cases of violent extremism involve the parents, similar to the methods used by the municipality. It is also useful that all imams have been trained in a standardized manner, though it is unclear on which specific subject from this interview. It would be useful as well to follow up on this interview with the Skopje religious leader to determine whether the training on communication with youth was held and its results, as well as future initiatives.

Related to the issue of the religious community’s involvement in CVE processes, the same group of respondents to the questionnaire

that provided answers to the previous question about violent incidents in schools were further asked for their opinion *whether if the violence is conducted due to ethnic or religious motives, should the religious communities get involved?* On the national level 21.76% said that the religious communities should be involved, while 45.61% opposed this idea. A high 31.38% of the respondents did not know. This is an interesting finding in that quite a low number of respondents were in support of the religious community becoming involved this issue, and nearly half of the respondents were opposed to it. About 77% either were unsure or opposed to it. This surprising finding, and in particular the high number of persons who were left unsure, illustrates the complexity of the notion of involving religious leaders in CVE efforts. The idea that religious leaders should surely be involved in CVE efforts, often espoused by policymakers, may actually be opposed by the people. This may be because doing so has the potential to further isolate members of particular faiths and to perpetuate stereotypes about certain faiths being more “violent” than others. It may also put too much pressure on religious leaders to try to manage events that are often outside their control. This lack of knowledge about whether involving religious leaders in CVE efforts and also the society’s opposition to their being involved is something that should be seriously considered before moving on with any project, and if religious leaders are involved, how they are involved and the duties they are given should be considered carefully.

METHODS OF DATA AND INFORMATION COLLECTION ON CVE

The fourth critical component of the baseline study is the methods used to collect and share data related to CVE and CVE-related efforts. An often-noted problem for CVE policymakers in North Macedonia is the unavailability of reliable and consistent data. This problem could be counteracted through data and information collection methods, both formal and informal, on the part of all the stakeholders in the CVE orbit. It is further on the basis of this information that formal data and information collection mechanisms within and between stakeholder organizations (schools, municipalities, religious communities, and national government administration) can be established through subsequent projects.

According to the respondents, the teachers are undoubtedly the first recipients of information that is further transferred to the support staff. In Skopje, several interviewees highlighted this cooperation in information gathering among the teachers and the support staff (Int. 1, SK; Int. 5, SK; and Int. 6, SK). Few schools in Skopje gather this kind of information primarily from the students (Int. 2, SK), noting that not always students are the most trustworthy source (Int. 3, SK) because they are still children. Worthy here of consideration is the importance of not making the school

into a spying ground and where students feel the need to “tell” on the others. It may also be questioned whether or not high school students are mature enough to be able to “collect” information about other students in correct and useful ways. While it is certainly viable to encourage students to come forward to administration with what they perceive to be potentially extremist behavior, as well as to encourage the teachers to be involved in their students’ lives so as to protect them from harm, there is a danger of the teachers becoming the eyes and ears of the state, not to mention the risk of enabling students to effectively police one another. This is particularly a threat when one considers the lack of ability on the part of teachers and other stakeholders, and not to mention their high-school age pupils, to distinguish between violent extremism and other phenomena, including mere religiosity. Thus, involving students and teachers in the monitoring of students is a sensitive issue that must be approached with extreme caution, taking into consideration the Do No Harm Approach. .

Regarding the question about how data and information about CVE are collected within municipalities, , the general impression is that the municipal representatives are unable to reflect on the

process of collecting information related to radicalization and violent extremism. A majority of the interviewees failed to answer this question or provided very vague answers (Int. 8, SK; Int. 9, SK; Int. 12, SK; Int. 11, SK; Int. 6, KU and Int. 8, TE). Vagueness, particularly when it comes to VE, is dangerous. There is a danger of, as discussed previously, different phenomena being lumped together and generalized. For instance, if incidents within municipalities or of instances of extremism are not recorded consistently over time (i.e. reporting on the number, character, and level of violent incidents and of extremist rhetoric) it will be very difficult to make any analysis of that data and therefore to see if interventions are having any effect. It also signifies that there may be no concrete actions being taken with regard to data collection and the respondent is merely resorting to what they might think is the “correct answer.” However, one should bear in mind that the policy work on countering violent extremism has just started in the country and the vagueness might originate from the low level of knowledge and awareness of the national policy for countering violent extremism and the absence of a system of response to violent extremism. Since the adoption of the National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism by the Government of Republic of North Macedonia in February 2018, the municipalities also are responsible for contributing to the system of institutional response to this phenomenon. Municipal authorities are required to prepare local action plans and together with local action teams to contribute to the implementation of the National strategy for CVE. However, the findings of the CRPM research show that municipalities are remotely aware of their role in countering violent extremism. What is more, neither the Strategy nor the municipalities as noted by the research are aware of the responsibility to collect data related to VE. To this end the project should increase knowledge and awareness among municipal stakeholders on the National CVE Strategy and discuss the needs and adequate responses to the municipal needs leading to prevention from radicalization and violent extremism

as well as possibilities for each municipality to contribute to the implementation of the Strategy. Furthermore, the municipalities capacities need to be improved in order for them to have an active role in the response system to violent extremism, but also to follow and report upon the number, character, and level of violent incidents and of extremist rhetoric used by multiple stakeholders in the community. Setting up a system for data gathering and data keeping on local level as well as regular reporting and analysis of the trends on national level would be critical. To this end, and in order for the response to VE is effective, it is important to establish link between the local level authorities that work on P/CVE and the National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism. This will inevitably improve the situation detected, where the vagueness of the municipality regarding its information collection on VE is seen to be problematic because they represent an important cog in the overall machine of monitoring and policing VE within a given municipality. This vagueness across the board on municipalities could represent a significant weakness for overall implementation of the National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism at local levels.

On the other hand, the MoI officials collaborating with the LCPs named multiple sources of information. The interlocutor from Skopje noted that in recent times the police rely mainly on social media as a primary source of information:

“In recent times, our main source of information about these issues is the internet, in particular the social media. We join many groups and ‘like’ Facebook pages in order to stay informed. As other less important sources of information I would also mention the colleagues, random bystanders etc.” (Int. 13, SK)

It is a positive sign that the Ministry of Interior recognizes the extent to which social media is used in the propagation of violent extremism, and monitoring those online presences enables

officials to view content and watch public interactions, which can help to determine how the radicalization process can take place. It would be useful to know here further how they use social media and interact with it in their monitoring, as well as what kind of information is provided to them by their colleagues and by “random bystanders,” and how that information is used.

The last category of interviewees, the religious leaders, was rather laconic when asked about the means of acquiring information related to radicalization and extremism. All the religious representatives apart from the mufti in Skopje, either failed to provide information, or gave imprecise answers. This lack of ability of the religious leaders to provide answers is potentially problematic. Similar to the municipal representatives, it appears that there is no formal mechanism of information gathering in place, other than informal methods. Because the mosques are closest to the people with regard to religious thought, and they are somewhat able to control various narratives or the groups in their institution, the fact that they seem not to have information collection mechanisms in place is worrisome. The mufti from Skopje pointed out the formal network of imams and mosques under his authority as the primary source of information. All other stakeholders usually share the information with the imams which later disseminate the information through the vertical hierarchy:

“We gather information from multiple sources. Taking into consideration that we have imams in more than 130 mosques on the territory of Skopje, we have contacts on daily basis both with the imams and the ‘mosque committees’. In this manner, we have immediate information about the events in all the mosques. If something out of the normal appears it attracts our immediate and full attention. We also gather information from the parents, because when they notice something unfamiliar with their children, they ask for help from the imams. These cases are not very frequent, but they still occur.” (Int. 14, SK)

These information gathering methods as described by the mufti from Skopje seem that, while useful, they are not standardized and present in all mosques in the country. What would be especially useful would be the formal network of imams of the mosques under the authority of a mufti and the mosque committees (it would be useful to examine the work of the mosque committees and to determine how they might also become involved). To standardize this practice across the entire religious community, no matter which faith, would certainly be fruitful. Further, though the methods of information gathering as provided by the Skopje mufti could provide a blueprint for the other faith communities in the country in regards to regulating community affairs through committees, the other methods seem rather ad-hoc. It would be of use to introduce a more official and regularly-occurring method of monitoring.

This more ad-hoc approach to data and information collection was also described by the Ministry of Interior Official from Skopje in a statement that emphasizes the lack of specificity of the relationship when it comes to information sharing between the police and other stakeholders, and that official further emphasized the necessity of having such communication:

“The police have contacts with all local stakeholders, but not regarding violence, radicalization, or extremism. In some parts of the City of Skopje there is a strong need for establishing of these mechanisms: Gjorche Petrov, Saraj, Gazi Baba, Chair and Bit Pazar would be the hotspots in the City of Skopje”. (Int. 13, SK).

All the interviewed religious leaders concluded that there are no formal mechanisms established with regard to information sharing and data collection. Two interlocutors in particular underpinned the need for their establishing (Int. 7, TE and Int. 2, TE and GV)

RESOURCES AND INITIATIVES NEEDED FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND RADICALIZATION IN SCHOOLS

The last element to examine for the baseline study of CVE stakeholders is what they identified in the interviews as being necessary for them to carry out their work more adequately, what resources or support they need, and who should be involved in their efforts in the future. To this end the following section also presents analysis of the training needs assessment that was integral part of the CRPM survey. A key element that was identified by the frontline school workers was need for further education and training on radicalization and violent extremism. Namely, the education staff needs their capacity built on the phenomena and the factors that impact the occurrence of radicalization as well as signs to detect radicalization in schools. Interestingly the capacity building needs on CVE-related topics, including but not limited to basics of violent extremism, recognizing extremist rhetoric, ethnic/religious tolerance, and protocols to follow in cases of noticing violent extremism have been identified not just front-line education workers but also for the students and for municipal administration.

For instance, the front line school workers were asked which *topics should be included in the high school curriculum in order to enhance the process of preventing radicalization of students*. The following topics were presented: basics of radicalization, violent extremism, and prevention; ethnic tolerance; religious tolerance; recognizing hate speech; recognizing extremist propaganda; conflict resolution; stereotypes and conflicts and their influence and critical thinking. The respondents were also provided with space to suggest other topics as well. Looking at the preferences on national level, 303 teachers opted for ethnic tolerance, while religious tolerance was mentioned 252 times followed by conflict resolution (223). Basics of radicalization, violent extremism and prevention were mentioned 206 times, while stereotypes and conflicts and their influence were the choice of 178 respondents. It is clear that a wide variety of topics on relevant local issues such as these should be added to the school curriculum so as to educate students on issues they will likely face in their daily lives to do with violent extremism. The

topics further relate to issues that touch on CVE and many other critical topics in Macedonian society, such as critical thinking and conflict resolution. It seems that the most needed topics were ethnic and religious tolerance.

The frontline school workers also emphasized what would be needed outside of the school curriculum to support them in combating violent extremism among the student population. While a vast majority of the respondents commented that there are no processes [of radicalization] in the schools where they work, several comments point towards the direction that this problem is not taken very seriously as it should and that the school staff should be trained and more heavily involved in the monitoring of these occurrences. These respondents highlight the need for more school staff support members like psychologists, pedagogues and sociologists that will work with and closely follow cases of students leaning towards radicalization. It is interesting to note that most of the frontline school workers insist that there are no processes of radicalization going on in their schools, but still maintain that the problem is not taken seriously enough and more workers should be involved in combatting it. It may be that they recognize some potential signs of radicalization or wish the school to be more engaged in prevention. It is also a positive sign to note that most have not seen direct processes of radicalization in their schools.

The statistics agree with this opinion of the school workers above that the school staff should be more involved and trained in monitoring of violent extremism related incidents. In regards to the question *whether in the last five years they have participated in any trainings related to interethnic integration, conflict resolution, dealing with violent and/or deviant behavior among students, introduction to processes of indoctrination and radicalization of students or any similar trainings*, 78.18% responded negatively, while 21.61% confirmed their

participation. The trends are similar on ethnic level, but almost twice as many Macedonians have been trained in comparison to Albanians: 28.78% vs. 14.64%. On municipal level, the figures mainly agreed with those on the national level. It is crucial, according to frontline school workers, to increase the number of school staff that have been trained in CVE/interethnic issues/conflict resolution, and particularly among ethnic Albanians, where the numbers of those who have participated in such trainings are significantly lower than the national average. It is further interesting to note that while trainings on these topics are usually among the most often stated necessary and crucial parts of CVE work in schools, it seems that it is correct that the problem of CVE is not taken very seriously in the education sphere.

The frontline school workers further suggested ideas related to workshops that could be held about extremism. The vast majority expressed the need for systematic approach to hold workshops for extremism and radicalization. Moreover, other suggestions included workshops for: conflict resolution, multi-ethnic integration, tolerance, deviation, mediation, emotional intelligence and coexistence. The key takeaway from this finding is in our view the need for a *systematic* approach that is applied universally, as opposed to the ad-hoc method that has seemed to dominate the happenings so far.

Proceeding with the in-depth face to face interviews, all four categories of respondents were asked *what they lacked institutionally in order to better prevent cases of violence, radicalization and extremism*. The frontline school workers in general commented that they need more trainings and seminars, in line with the dominant finding above, as well as resources for projects that would further engage the students. This indicates two things: there should be resources (both financial and also educational) that educators can use to engage the students on these topics, and that teachers

want to be more systematically engaged in this topic with their students. They require assistance in doing so.

This sentiment on systematic engagement as directed from above rather than ad-hoc and informal response mechanisms was further echoed by teachers. One teacher mentioned the need for protocols on further activity if a teacher detects violent, radical, or extremist behavior (Int. 1, GV), while another interviewee highlighted the need for equipping of the school support staff, as well as additional finances in general (Int. 2, GV), which echoes the general sentiment about resources for staff that was put forward by the frontline school workers.

Regarding the different stakeholders that the respondents felt should become more engaged in the processes of CVE within the society, one of the interviewees named two key stakeholders that should be engaged: the family, as the nucleus of society; and the schools – which should create mediation bodies that will closely follow these issues (Int. 4, SK). This respondent encouraged mediation on the part of the school, which was already happening in some schools as seen above, and according with this it might be useful to standardize this mediation on the part of the school in a national program. The respondents were further asked to prioritize the stakeholders that should intervene if they notice among students any signs of radicalization or indoctrination. Nationwide, the top three stakeholders identified by the respondents were parents (339), teachers (203), and the school support staff (148), with there being no significant differences in responses between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians. They were also asked what in their experience was the most common method of responding to violent incidents among students at their schools, to which 38% said that the most typical method was calling the parent of the student, 32% said that it was sending the student to the school psychologist

or pedagogue, and 27% said that it was discipline of the student by the head teacher.

One of the interviewees from Tetovo highlighted the role of media, the internet and the political parties in raising the alarm vocally regarding the discussed issues (Int. 6, TE). It could be useful to involve all stakeholders with a media voice (social media, news networks, traditional media) to raise awareness about the issue as well as national strategies combatting it. The interlocutors from Gostivar believe in stronger cooperation between the central and the local governments (Int. 1, GV and Int. 3, GV), but also in the inclusion of other stakeholders such as the teachers, the school support staff and the police (Int. 2, GV), which harkens back to the notion of standardizing mediation protocols at schools and involving everyone in national programs with different activities carried out by each stakeholder.

However, regarding the main actor who should take responsibility of responding to the phenomenon, troublingly, governmental actors were quite unclear, much less so than school workers. The municipal representatives were not as reflective as the frontline school workers regarding the question who should be the main stakeholders within the local communities to take actions in resolving incidents of violence, radicalization and extremism. Half of the municipal representatives could not provide a precise answer to the question (Int. 8, SK; Int. 11, SK; Int. 12, SK and Int. 6, KU). One interlocutor from a municipality in Skopje spoke about the need for overall involvement of all state institutions (Int. 10, SK), (Page 39) but this is quite vague and does not delegate responsibility anywhere in particular.

On the other hand, regarding this same question about who the main stakeholder should be in taking ownership of response to the phenomenon, the Mol officials working closely with the LCPs opted for a more integrative approach, synergizing as many stakeholders

as possible in the process of preventing violence, radicalization and extremism on community level. Our interlocutor from Skopje recalled a good practice from one of the municipalities in his area of operation:

“A very good example is the Municipality of Kisela Voda with its Center for Prevention and Treatment of Drug Addiction which is full of patients. A coordinative body was created from experts and citizens from many spheres. Still, institutions should increase their levels of specialization and knowledge in C/PVE.” (Int. 13, SK)

This example indicates a positive step that could be copied, perhaps on a national level (a coordinative body of experts from many spheres) that together respond to the complex phenomenon. However, it also indicates that though collaboration should be encouraged, there should be specific persons whose main responsibility is CVE. This indicates that there should be specific individuals in charge of CVE while also involving the opinions and expertise of all stakeholders whose work touches CVE. This will ensure the wide breadth of CVE activities but also the specific knowledge required of CVE for each sphere touched by it (education, religious institutions, local governance).

The last category of interviewees, the local religious leaders, gave diverse answers regarding the crucial stakeholders on local level who should play a crucial role in preventing violence, radicalization and extremisms. A religious leader from Gostivar believes that all competent institutions, but primarily the schools and the municipalities should be engaged (Int. 5, GV). His counterpart from Tetovo believes in the crucial role of the state, followed by the municipalities, the schools and then all other stakeholders (Int. 7, TE). An interesting question to examine regarding the model of Kisela Voda above would be whether or not the central and highest authority with regard to CVE should be the state, with all

other stakeholders taking their orders from the state, or whether the collaborative body would be the highest authority of decision making with regard to CVE policy and activities. This policy question should be something examined by research of looking at best practices from other countries.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section is providing conclusions of the findings of the baseline study. In the same time, it defines specific recommendations based on the research results for the project team to implement. Taking in consideration the project designs the recommendations are relevant to the second and third working package: (i) capacity building; and (ii) municipal preventive system.

CONCLUSIONS

A perception of frontline school workers across the board were either that Skopje was home to more individual becoming radicalized, and also perceptions of violent incidents in schools were significantly higher in Skopje than in other places in North Macedonia. These perceptions signify the overall impression of the respondents that Skopje is more affected by radicalization and/or violent extremism than other places in North Macedonia.

The responses and perceptions of the municipal representatives differed largely from the responses of the teachers and other frontline school workers, particularly regarding the differing perceptions

of whether or not there had been violent incidents recently among the students in the schools. The different perceptions of the municipal representatives from that of the teachers may suggest that there is a communication disconnect between frontline school workers and municipal employees in general, and also confuses the policymaker as to whether the incidents are actually decreasing or not, and thus confuses the determination of what policies work and in what context. Further, it suggests that according to the role played in the CVE orbit, different organizations can have different perspectives and interests or have access to different information, so they can have different or even opposite perceptions of the same phenomena.

There is a significant lack of awareness and comprehension of the national P/CVE strategies in North Macedonia and their action plans. Only the frontline school workers who had attended the OSCE's training on P/CVE had heard of these, but none of the others. These strategies should play a central part in future trainings on CVE and the National Committee should also have a role in creating/hosting the trainings. There is also a critical need for capacity building with regard to readiness to combat CVE and about its basic facts as well as materials produced to which frontline school workers can refer for protocols during violent extremist-related incidents in schools.

PResponses and protocols, such as the pre-election campaign monitoring undertaken by Kumanovo and Tetovo municipalities, as well as the religious community protocols used in the Skopje muftiate, should be standardized and used nationally in order to ensure preventive activities related to problems that have been identified in past trends and to have organized and across-the-board responses by all stakeholders.

In opposition to what seems to be the norm surrounding CVE projects, a vast majority of respondents said that religious leaders should either not be involved at all in CVE actions or that they were unsure of what the role of the religious leaders should be. This is an incredibly important finding as it goes against what is generally perceived with regard to involving religious leaders in efforts related to violent VE incidents. This finding can also suggest the need to do awareness on the role that religious leaders can have in the prevention and countering of violent extremism. This is especially relevant as on national level, front line school workers named the religious institutions and religious schools (46.73%) as suitable place for indoctrination and radicalization. Also, considering that none of the ongoing CVE projects tackle internet and social media, the study offers important finding that these are the most suitable place for indoctrination and radicalization (70.89%). Therefore, it is highly recommended to turn the attention to actions related to use of internet and safety online in the forthcoming efforts for prevention from radicalization. Working with peer groups (31.09%) should also be a priority to policy makers planning prevention activities.

When it comes to data and information collection, it is clear from respondents that teachers should be watchful when it comes to potential radicalization of the students, but that students themselves should not be expected to provide information on each other. It was clear from speaking with the municipal representatives and religious leaders, however, that no formal or official mechanisms of data collection exist. It would be critical to provide these two groups with training in what sort of data should be collected and how, as well as how that data might be analyzed. The Ministry of Interior was a bit more specific when it related its monitoring efforts on Facebook, but also lacked specificity about these monitoring

activities. It would therefore be wise to include MOI officials in training about data and information collection.

All the respondents stressed the need for the introduction of the topics of ethnic and religious tolerance to the national high school curriculum, in addition to conflict resolution and the bases of radicalization. Frontline school workers themselves stressed the need for trainings in how to handle and respond to the phenomenon, and a vast majority had not attended a training related to ethnic integration, VE, or similar topic in the past five years. They suggested possible topics for the trainings, including interethnic integration and conflict resolution. They also emphasized the great need for a systematic approach that is applied universally with regard to holding these trainings for frontline school workers, as opposed to the mainly ad-hoc methods that have been used thus far. The teachers also insisted the need for a protocol to use if they notice signs of radicalization, as well as for educational and financial resources to deal with VE in general. The training program that is planned as a part of the project associated with this report will create three training modules based on the needs identified, training materials, and tools for detection including checklists and protocols. The topics for the training program will include basic information about violent extremism and radicalization, developing methods of preventing radicalization among students, and defining a system of support on a school, municipal, and national level.

The question of ownership of the issue of P/CVE was not answered clearly by the municipal representatives, while the collaboration between the national and local governments in coordination with schools was identified by the frontline workers as the main stakeholders who should take ownership of the issue. Along with the recommendations outlined above, we argue that there should be a clear and standardized chain of command for who “owns” the

issue of CVE and who directs the other stakeholders in their roles, while also emphasizing the importance of each stakeholder.

RECOMMENDATIONS

CAPACITY BUILDING ON DETECTION OF RADICALIZATION LEADING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM

- ✓ Build capacity of front-line education workers but also for the students on the basics of violent extremism, recognizing extremist rhetoric, ethnic/religious tolerance, signs to detect radicalization and protocols to follow in cases of noticing violent extremism have been identified
- ✓ Develop a training program that will include the following topics: basics of radicalization, violent extremism, and prevention; ethnic tolerance; religious tolerance; recognizing hate speech; recognizing extremist propaganda; conflict resolution; stereotypes and conflicts and their influence and critical thinking
- ✓ Develop tools for detection and supporting school staff recognizing some potential signs of radicalization or wish the school to be more engaged in prevention
- ✓ Develop protocols (and checklists) for teachers, psychologist and pedagogues to detect violent, radical, or extremist behavior in classroom and manage the school process towards countering radicalization that can lead to violent extremism
- ✓ Institutionalize the capacity building program for education staff as teachers need systematic approach to acquiring

knowledge and skills on extremism and radicalization, but also on conflict resolution, multi-ethnic integration, tolerance, deviation, mediation, emotional intelligence and coexistence. Integrate these topics in teacher training curriculum.

MUNICIPAL PREVENTIVE SYSTEM FROM RADICALIZATION LEADING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM

- ✓ increase knowledge and awareness among municipal stakeholders on the National CVE Strategy
- ✓ invigorate dialogue on local level as to discuss the needs and adequate responses to the municipal needs leading to prevention from radicalization and violent extremism as well as possibilities for each municipality to contribute to the implementation of the Strategy
- ✓ Better communication mechanisms surrounding violent incidents at schools should be established, with direct and regular communication between the schools and municipal officials.
- ✓ develop a specific to the municipality capacity communication model of the referral system based on the whole of society approach engaging all relevant stakeholders on local level
- ✓ improve municipal capacities for them to have an active role in the response system to violent extremism, but also to

follow and report upon the number, character, and level of violent incidents and of extremist rhetoric used by multiple stakeholders in the community

- ✓ set up a system for data gathering and data keeping on local level as well as regular reporting and analysis of the trends on national level
- ✓ establish link between the local level authorities that work on P/CVE and the National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism.
- ✓ Build capacity of municipal administration on the basics of violent extremism, recognizing extremist rhetoric, ethnic/religious tolerance, signs to detect radicalization and protocols to follow in cases of noticing violent extremism have been identified
- ✓ Provide resources (both financial and also educational) that educators can use to engage the students on violent extremism and radicalization topics
- ✓ Since teachers want to be more systematically engaged in this topic with their students all school programs need to embed activities on violent extremism and radicalization. The municipal council adopts the school program and therefore on municipal level there should be a mechanism screening whether the school program encompasses activities related to countering violent extremism and radicalization.

EVALUATION OF THE PROJECT

Based on the findings of this study the following recommendations detailed interventions / additions to project activities are prescribed to the project team. The table below also offers proposal on possible verification means of the results of each recommendations based on the baseline study.

MAIN FINDINGS / RECOMMENDATIONS	ACTIVITY TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE PROJECT	VERIFICATION OF RESULTS
<i>Capacity building on detection of radicalization leading to violent extremism</i>		
Build capacity of front-line education workers	Activity 2.1. Training program to include the following topics: basics of radicalization, violent extremism, and prevention; ethnic tolerance; religious tolerance; recognizing hate speech; recognizing extremist propaganda; conflict resolution; stereotypes and conflicts and their influence and critical thinking	Number of trained teachers Training reports Pre/post evaluation of training results
Develop tools for detection and supporting school staff recognizing some potential signs of radicalization	Activity 2.2. Develop protocols (and checklists) for teachers, psychologist and pedagogues to detect violent, radical, or extremist behavior in classroom and manage the school process	Protocols and checklists
Institutionalize E2P training curriculum in teacher training program	(not in planned activities) Integrate knowledge and skills on extremism and radicalization, but also on conflict resolution, multi-ethnic integration, tolerance, deviation, mediation, emotional intelligence and coexistence in teacher training curriculum	Request opinion form Bureau for development of education on the training curriculum and tools (considering the life of the project is short) and based on the results initiate procedure for inclusion of E2P training program in teacher training curriculum

MAIN FINDINGS / RECOMMENDATIONS	ACTIVITY TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE PROJECT	VERIFICATION OF RESULTS
<i>Municipal preventive system from radicalization leading to violent extremism</i>		
Increase knowledge and awareness among municipal stakeholders on the National CVE Strategy	(not in planned activities) Through organization of round table discussions invigorate dialogue on local level as to discuss the needs and adequate responses to the municipal needs	Report from round tables and recommendations
Better communication mechanisms surrounding violent incidents at schools	Activity 3.1. a. Develop a specific to the municipality capacity communication model of the referral system	Referral model
Improve municipal capacities for them to have an active role in the response system to violent extremism	Activity 3.3. Develop training program encompassing: basics of violent extremism, recognizing extremist rhetoric, ethnic/religious tolerance, signs to detect radicalization	Training program Number of trained policy makers and other stakeholders Training reports Pre/post evaluation of training results
Development of a policy model for prevention from radicalization	Activity 3.1. but needs to include <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ set up a system for data gathering and data keeping on local level ✓ establish link between the local level authorities that work on P/CVE and the National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism ✓ Provide resources (both financial and also educational) that educators can use ✓ screening whether the school program encompasses activities related to countering violent extremism and radicalization 	Policy model and Guidebook



ANNEX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SCHOOL STAFF

Respected,

The questions that follow aim to assess your opinions on different topics related to security issues in the school.

Part of the questions are multiple choice, part require making responses in the appropriate field and part – filling in data/information. There are no correct or incorrect responses.

We recommend you to provide honest responses. Your responses will assist us in preparing a wider program for training the school staff to better understand the security situation in the school, as well as developing teaching practices for managing certain security challenges.

The process of completing the questionnaire should last about 20 minutes.

1

According to you, which are the three largest threats to security which North Macedonia is facing currently? Which are the three largest security challenges that the world is facing (globally)?

(mark **X** in the appropriate fields)

	In North Macedonia	In the world (globally)
Corruption		
Political instability		
Ethnic tensions		
Terrorism		
Organize crime		
Violent extremism		
Religious radicalism		
Migrant-refugee crisis		
Other (please add)		

2

To which degree do you agree with the following claims?

(mark **X** in the appropriate fields)

	COMPLETELY AGREE	PARTIALLY AGREE	DISAGREE	COMPLETELY DISAGREE	I DON'T KNOW
Extremism is a serious threat to our society					
The one who has radical ideological-political opinions, becomes violent					
The one who has radical ideological political opinions will try to transfer them to others					
The one who has religious-radical opinions, becomes violent					
The one who has religious-radical opinions will try to transfer them to others					
The one who advocates for ethnic intolerance, becomes violent					
The one who promotes ethnic intolerance will try to transfer them to others					
In young people, having radical opinions is only a passing phase in their development					

3

According to you, how important are the following reasons for some young people to accept radical ideologies which propagate use of violence?

(mark **X** in the appropriate fields)

	VERY SIGNIFICANT	PARTIALLY SIGNIFICANT	INSIGNIFICANT	I DON'T KNOW
They are violent by nature and request for ways to justify their aggression				
They believe that through use of violence they will be more valued/respected from the environment				
They feel that they are victims of the unjustness of the system and rebel because of that				
They have difficulties to fit in the environment, and look for groups which will accept them				
They cannot see a better alternative (with regards to ideology) in the environment they live in				
They try to defend themselves from the 'domination' of the majority in the community, by making themselves different than others				
They feel discriminated (ex. on ethnic, religious, political and social basis)				
They consider that to be an appropriate reaction to certain global injustices (unresolved conflicts, wars, repressions on certain ethnic, religious, political groups)				
They seek adventure and excitement				
They are curious regarding different ideologies				
They are in search of their identity/sense of belonging				
They search for answers/more understanding about religion and find them in extremist groups				
Other (please add)				

4

According to your opinion, which places/environments are suitable for indoctrination¹ and radicalization of young people?

(please select three from the options below)

- ☐ Home
- ☐ School
- ☐ Religious institutions/religious schools
- ☐ Internet and social media
- ☐ TV and radio
- ☐ Peer groups
- ☐ Youth organizations
- ☐ Party youth organizations
- ☐ Fan groups of sports clubs
- ☐ Other *(please add)* _____
- ☐ I don't know

¹ Macedonian translation of "indoctrination"

5

Do you think that in your school there is a process of radicalization of students on a religious basis?

(please select one of the options below)

- ☐ Yes, it exists since always, with the same intensity
- ☐ Yes, it exists since always, but increases from year to year
- ☐ Yes, it begun during the past few years
- ☐ No
- ☐ I don't know

6

Do you think that in your school there are attitudes of ethnic intolerance among students?

(please select one of the options below)

- ☐ Yes, it exists since always, with the same intensity
- ☐ Yes, it exists since always, but increases from year to year
- ☐ Yes, it begun during the past few years
- ☐ No
- ☐ I don't know

7

According to you, which are the most appropriate places for addressing the problems of radicalization and indoctrination of students/young people?

(please select three of the options below)

- ☐ Home, with the parents
- ☐ At school
- ☐ In religious objects (places where religion is practiced)/religious schools
- ☐ Through Internet and social media
- ☐ Through TV and radio
- ☐ In the peer groups
- ☐ In the youth organizations
- ☐ In the political party youth organizations
- ☐ In the sports clubs' cheering groups
- ☐ In NGOs (non-governmental organizations)
- ☐ In specialized psychological, medical institutions
- ☐ Correctional institutions
- ☐ Police and security services
- ☐ Other *(please add)* _____

8

If there are activities being conducted in the school aimed at tackling indoctrination and radicalization among students, what is the most appropriate method for these to be realized?

(please select one of the options below)

- ☐ In the frames of the regular/mandatory curriculum. On the following subjects:
-
- ☐ In the frames of the regular/mandatory curriculum, during the class hour.
- ☐ In the frames of additional classes
- ☐ In the frame of extracurricular activities
- ☐ Other *(please add)* _____
- ☐ I don't know

9

According to you, how much should religion/religious teachings be part of the formal education?

(please select one of the options below)

- ☐ They should not be part of the curriculum
- ☐ All larger religions should be taught on a basic level
- ☐ All religions that students associate with should be taught on a basic level
- ☐ All larger religions should be taught on a deeper level
- ☐ All religions that students associate with should be taught on a deeper level
- ☐ Other *(please add)* _____
- ☐ I don't know

10

Which of the following topics should be part of the secondary school curriculum, with the aim of preventing radicalization of students?

- ☐ Basics of radicalization, violent extremism and prevention
- ☐ Ethnic tolerance
- ☐ Religious tolerance
- ☐ Recognizing hate speech
- ☐ Recognizing extremist propaganda
- ☐ Conflict resolution
- ☐ Stereotypes and conflicts and their influence
- ☐ Critical thinking
- ☐ None of the above
- ☐ Other *(please add)* _____
- ☐ I don't know

11

In the case you notice signs of indoctrination and radicalization among students, who do you think should react/intervene

(in the order of priority, mark with numbers ranging from 1 to 8, where 1 signifies the first factor which should intervene, while 8-the last factor). If you consider that some of the parties should not intervene at all, please put 0 in the square.)

- ☐ Parents
- ☐ Teachers
- ☐ School support/professional staff
- ☐ Municipal administration
- ☐ Religious communities
- ☐ Social services
- ☐ Police / security forces
- ☐ Civic / non-governmental organizations
- ☐ Other *(please add)* _____

12

Write the three words which first come to your mind when you hear the word “extremism”

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____

13

Write the three words which first come to your mind when you hear the word “radicalization”

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____

14

According to you, which students/young people are most susceptible to accept radical ideologies?

(you can select more options)

- ☐ Students from families with lower education
- ☐ Students from poorer families
- ☐ Students from rural areas
- ☐ Students from very religious families
- ☐ Students from families which not practice religion frequently

- ☐ Students from non-religious families
- ☐ Students from families with broken relationship between the parents
- ☐ Students from families in which vices are present (alcoholism, drug abuse, gambling, crime, etc.)
- ☐ Students living in mono-ethnic environments
- ☐ Students living in multiethnic environments
- ☐ There are no rules, everyone is susceptible, regardless of the background
- ☐ I don't know

15

Regarding the degree of violence between students, where would you place your school?

(please select one of the options)

- ☐ Nonviolent
- ☐ Partially violent
- ☐ Violent

16

During 2017 and 2018, had there been violent incidents in the school?

(please select one of the options)

- ☐ Yes (continue to question 17)
- ☐ No (continue to question 20)
- ☐ I don't remember

17

Was the violence:

(please select one of the options)

- ☐ Religiously motivated
- ☐ Ethnically motivated
- ☐ Religiously and ethnically motivated
- ☐ Other _____

18

What is the typical reaction to these types of incidents?

(select all relevant options)

- ☐ Parents of the students are being called to the school
- ☐ The class teacher/s discipline the students
- ☐ Students go to counseling to the school psychologist/ pedagogue
- ☐ Students receive a decreasing mark in behavior
- ☐ Students are excluded from the school
- ☐ The incident is being reported to the police
- ☐ The incident is being reported to the social services
- ☐ Nothing is done
- ☐ Other _____
- ☐ I don't know

19

If the violence is conducted due to ethnic or religious motives do you think that religious communities should get involved?

(please select one of the options)

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ I don't know



Should there be a reaction (and what type) by the school in case the following hypothetical situations occur?

(please mark **X** in the appropriate fields, you can select more than one reaction for each situation)

Situations	There should be no reaction	Verbal warning	Receiving a decreasing mark in behavior	Exclusion from the school	Advising with the support/ professional staff	Other (please state)
Student refuses to participate in certain activities due to religious motives						
Student refuses to learn certain contents due to religious motives						
Student begins to dress more conservatively						
Student separates from the peers (the group s/he was socializing with)						
Student shares flyers/propaganda materials which call to violence in the school or outside of the school						
Student shares video materials which call to violence on the Internet/social media						
Student acts arrogantly towards teachers and school staff						
Student skips classes in order to meet with extremist or extremist groups						
Student refuses to contact/communicate with students belonging to different ethnic and/or religious community						
Student verbally attacks/insults students belonging to different ethnic and/or religious community						
Student physically attacks/insults students belonging to different ethnic and/or religious community						

21

Do you have additional comments related to the processes of radicalization in your school?

22

Do you have personal experience with radicalization in your school that you would like to share?

23

Within the last 5 years, have you participated in any trainings related to interethnic integration, conflict resolution, dealing with violent and/or deviant behavior among students, introduction to processes of indoctrination and radicalization of students or any similar trainings?

- ☐ Yes (continue to question 24)
- ☐ No (continue to question 27)

24

Please enlist the trainings you took part in within the last 10 years, which have been connected to: interethnic integration, conflict resolution, dealing with violent and/or deviant behavior among students, introduction to processes of indoctrination and radicalization of students or any similar trainings?

Topic	Organized by:	Type of training (e.g. lecture, workshop, mentoring)

EXPERIENCE WITH PAST TRAININGS

25

Please name three things that you liked/enjoyed during previous trainings?

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____

26

What would you suggest to the organizers to evade while organizing trainings?

FURTHER NEEDS FOR TRAININGS

27

Which future challenges do you see within your work related activities related to: interethnic integration, conflict resolution, dealing with violent and/or deviant behavior among students, introduction to processes of indoctrination and radicalization of students?

28

Which types of trainings do you need in order to realize your work related activities related to: interethnic integration, conflict resolution, dealing with violent and/or deviant behavior among students, introduction to processes of indoctrination and radicalization of students?

PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS.

29

Gender

- ☐ female
☐ male

30

Age

- ☐ 22-34
☐ 35-49
☐ 50+

31

Which ethnic group do you belong to?

- ☐ Macedonian ☐ Serbian
☐ Albanian ☐ Roma
☐ Turkish ☐ Vlach
☐ Other (please add) _____

32

Completed education (*degree, faculty*):

33

Position in the school:

- ☐ Teacher (proceed to question **34 A**)
☐ Member of other staff (psychologist, pedagogue, de-
fectologist, sociologist) (proceed to question **34 B**)

34

A (If the respondent is a teacher) Subject/s you teach:

B (If the respondent is part of the support service) Please state your position:

- ☐ Psychologist ☐ Sociologist
☐ Pedagogue ☐ Special Ed. Teacher

32

Years of work experience in education:

33

Would you accept being interviewed regarding the topics included in this questionnaire? (*Your personal data will remain anonymous and will not be included in any report*)

- ☐ Yes ☐ No

If you have responded with – Yes, please leave your telephone number and/or email, for further contact

THANK YOU!

ANNEX 2: SURVEY SAMPLING

Town	School	Number of surveys
Skopje	СУГС „Арсени Јовков“	25
Skopje	СУГС „8 Септември“	25
Skopje	СУГС „Цветан Димов“	25
Skopje	СУГС „Панче Караџов“	25
Skopje	СУГС „Боро Петрушевски“	25
Skopje	СУГС „Зеф Љуш Марку“	25
Skopje	СУГС „Марија Кири-Склодовска“	25
Tetovo	СУ „Гоце Стојчевски“	25
Tetovo	СУ „Кирил Пејчиновиќ“	25
Tetovo	ССОУ „Моша Пијаде“	25
Tetovo	Медицинско училиште „Никола Штејн“	25
Tetovo	ДСЕУ „8ми Септември“	25
Tetovo	СМУ „Тодор Скаловски - Тетоец“	25

Town	School	Number of surveys
Kumanovo	Гимназија „Гоце Делчев“	25
Kumanovo	СУ „Гоце Делчев“	25
Kumanovo	СУ „Киро Бурназ“	25
Kumanovo	ДСТУ „Наце Буѓони“	25
Kumanovo	СОУ „Перо Наков“	25
Gostivar	СЕОУ „Гостивар“	25
Gostivar	ЦСНО „Злате Малакоски“	25
Gostivar	Гимназија „Панче Попоски“	25

**TOTAL SURVEY
525**

